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This note considers possible legal challenges to the original Section 
232 steel order and recommends different actions for alleviating the problem 
of broad executive power delegated by Congress in Section 232. Parts I and 
II provide an introduction and background to Section 232. Part III analyzes 
the constitutionality of Section 232 under both the Court’s current 
jurisprudence of the nondelegation doctrine and potential changes to the 
doctrine suggested by the dissent in Gundy. Part IV assesses potential 
challenges to the steel order under the theory that the President acted outside 
of the scope of his authority conferred by the statute. Part V assesses whether 
the action is consistent with global trade rules and what the potential effects 
of a WTO violation are under domestic law. Lastly, because of the weakness 
of the legal arguments against Section 232 and the steel order, Part VI 
provides recommendations for how Congress, as opposed to the courts, 
might deal with the problems posed by Section 232. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum 
products under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended 
(19 U.S.C. § 1862) (“Section 232”).1 Section 232 allows the president to take 
actions to adjust imports that threaten to impair the national security. The 
President imposed these tariffs citing national security concerns over the 
ability of the U.S. steel industry to remain viable long-term, so that the U.S. 
military can continue to source domestic steel. The actual strength and 
authenticity of these national security concerns have been questioned.2 Many 
are suspicious that the tariffs were driven by domestic industry and purely 
economic interests and that the claimed national security concerns are mere 
pretext.3 
Following these tariffs, the American Institute for International Steel 
(AIIS) sued the government in the Court of International Trade (CIT), 
challenging the constitutionality of the delegation of power to the president 
under Section 232.4 On March 25, 2019, the CIT held that the statute was not 
an unconstitutional delegation, finding itself bound by Supreme Court 
 
 1. Proclamation No. 9710, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,355 (Mar. 28, 2018); Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 13,361 (Mar. 28, 2018). 
 2. E.g., John Brinkley, Trump’s National Security Tariffs Have Nothing to Do with National 
Security, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/03/12/trumps-
national-security-tariffs-have-nothing-to-do-with-national-security/#599a2eaa706c; Simon Lester & 
Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the National Security Rationale for Restricting 
Trade, CATO INSTIT. (June 25, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/closing-
pandoras-box-growing-abuse-national-security-rationale; Mount Tariff Erupts Again, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mount-tariff-erupts-again-11575331304 (“[H]e seems to think he 
can use tariffs as a two-fer to help struggling U.S. steel makers while punishing Argentina and Brazil for 
displacing U.S. farm exports to China.”). Even CIT judge Gary Katzmann stated during oral argument, 
“I scratch my head a little bit about . . . the rationality [of the presidential action],” which seemingly 
ignores the Secretary of Defense “saying that only three percent of domestic production is needed for 
American military needs.” Transcript at 51, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 
3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (No. 18-00152). 
 3. See Brinkley, supra note 2; Lester & Zhu, supra note 2. 
 4. Complaint, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2019) (No. 18-00152). 
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precedent.5 However, the CIT also expressed concern over the wide breadth 
of action and discretion available under the statute.6 AIIS appealed the 
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the court 
affirmed the CIT’s ruling in an unpublished opinion.7 AIIS has petitioned for 
certiorari with the Supreme Court.8 Other cases filed at the CIT have attacked 
the steel orders directly (rather than the statute on its face) by claiming that 
specific actions lacked a sufficient national security nexus, were made for 
reasons other than national security, or violated procedural requirements in 
the statute, and, therefore, were outside of the authority delegated to the 
President by Congress.9 At the World Trade Organization (WTO), many 
nations have filed complaints against the United States for violating the 
United States’ WTO obligations in its imposition of tariffs under Section 
232.10 
Other Section 232 investigations underway include imports of 
automobiles,11 uranium,12 and titanium sponge.13 According to the President, 
 
 5. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) 
(No. 18-00152). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Order, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Ct. App. 
Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020). See also Christopher Cole, Fed. Circ. Casts Doubt on Nixing White House Tariff 
Power, LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1229731/fed-circ-casts-doubt-on-
nixing-white-house-tariff-power. 
 8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No 19-1177 (Mar. 
27, 2020). 
 9. Complaint at 3, Medtrade Inc. v. United States, 415 F.Supp.3d 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (No. 
19-00009) (motion to dismiss denied); Amended Complaint at 2–3, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United 
States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 1, 2019) (No. 19-00009); Complaint at 1, Severstal 
Export Gmbh v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298 (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 22, 2018), 
dismissed with prejudice, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 3, 2018). 
 10. Request for Consultations by the European Union, United States—Certain Measures on Steel 
and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018); Request for Consultations by Mexico, 
United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 5, 
2018); Request for Consultations by Norway, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS552/1 (June 12, 2018); Request for Consultations by Russia, United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS554/1 (June 29, 2018); Request 
for Consultations by Switzerland, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS556/1 (July 9, 2018); Request for Consultations by Turkey, United States—Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS564/1 (Aug. 15, 2018); Request for 
Consultations by China, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS544/1 (Apr. 5, 2018); Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Certain Measures on 
Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 1, 2018). 
 11. Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security 
Investigation of Imports of Automobiles, Including Cars, SUVs, Vans and Light Trucks, and Automotive 
Parts, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,735 (May 30, 2018). 
 12. Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of 
Imports of Uranium, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (July 25, 2018).  
 13. Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of 
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the Department of Commerce concluded that foreign auto imports pose a 
national security threat. The administration has not made the report public, 
despite congressional action directing the President to release the report.14 
The President decided not to impose national security tariffs on uranium ore, 
but did establish a working group to review the domestic industry.15 No 
decisions have yet been made regarding titanium sponge.16 
The increased use of Section 232 has led to more market uncertainty 
than other trade remedy laws because of the fewer procedural protections 
and the comparative ease of implementing this type of action.17 The use of 
Section 232 has also increased tensions internationally, as evidenced by the 
many complaints filed against the United States at the WTO.18 Statements 
by the President indicating the potential for using Section 232 tariffs on 
automobiles as a negotiating tool for more favorable concessions in trade 
agreements19 have supported international skepticism that the United States 
is not acting in good faith over national security concerns. The imposition of 
unilateral tariffs, the declaration of trade wars, and the blocking of Appellate 
Body members at the WTO, which has left the Appellate Body effectively 
disabled, have cast serious doubts as to the longevity of the global trade 
regime and the United States’ position in that regime.20 
 
Imports of Titanium Sponge, 84 Fed. Reg. 8,503 (Mar. 8, 2019). 
 14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLICATION OF A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE EFFECT OF 
AUTOMOBILE AND AUTOMOBILE-PART IMPORTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY (2020). 
 15. RACHEL F. FEFER & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10667, SECTION 232 OF THE 
TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, at 2 (2020). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Uncertainty over Auto Tariffs May Not End Soon, PETERSON INST. 
FOR INT’L ECON. (Apr. 24, 2019, 3:15PM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-
watch/uncertainty-over-auto-tariffs-may-not-end-soon; RACHEL F. FEFER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
IF10971, SECTION 232 AUTO INVESTIGATION 2 (2018) (“The uncertainty created by the current and 
potential tariffs on autos and auto parts may also reduce investment.”); Eliana Johnson & Andrew 
Restuccia, Trump Administration Withholds Report Justifying “Shock” Auto Tariffs, POLITICO (May 20, 
2019) (“‘More than anything,’ the Auto Alliance’s [Vice President of Governmental Affairs] said, ‘our 
companies like certainty and predictability, and they’re just not finding much of it these days.’”), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/20/trump-tariffs-automobiles-commerce-1228344. 
 18. See supra, note 10. 
 19. See Johnson & Restuccia, supra note 16 (“‘We’re trying to make a deal,’ [Trump] said. ‘They’re 
very tough to make a deal with, the EU . . . . We’re negotiating with them. If we don’t make the deal, 
we’ll do the tariffs.’”), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/20/trump-tariffs-automobiles-
commerce-1228344; 
 20. See U.S. TRADE REP., REPORT ON THE APPELLATE BODY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (Feb. 2020), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_ 
World_Trade_Organization.pdf; BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10385, THE WTO’S 
APPELLATE BODY LOSES ITS QUORUM: IS THIS THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE “RULES-BASED 
TRADING SYSTEM”? (2019); Section 301 Investigations, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301-china/record-section-
301 (last visited Apr. 13, 2019); Sabrina Rodriguez, Lighthizer Proposes Use of Section 301 for USMCA 
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Section 232 is not the only statute and trade is not the only substantive 
area where Congress has conferred powers to the President with shockingly 
broad discretion and little oversight. For example, in the immigration 
context, broad congressional delegations and the “plenary” power doctrine, 
which restrains the courts’ review, have resulted in enormous authority by 
the executive over immigration.21 The National Emergencies Act (NEA)22 
also delegates broad power to the executive. President Trump threatened to 
use the NEA to fund a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border in the name of 
“national security” after Congress failed to budget for such a wall.23 The 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) also confers 
emergency economic powers to the President.24 President Trump threatened 
to use IEEPA to impose tariffs on Mexico if Mexico did not take action to 
stop immigration from Mexico into the United States.25 By a recent count, 
there are 123 statutes that delegate powers to the President in the case of a 
presidential declaration of a “national emergency.”26 These are just a few 
examples of why broad delegations of statutory authority to the President 
matter and greatly affect the distribution of powers within the government. 
I will analyze possible legal challenges to the original Section 232 steel 
order (not subsequent amendments) and recommend different actions for 
alleviating the problem of broad executive power delegated by Section 232.27 
Part II provides background on the establishment of Section 232, the 
previous investigations and orders implemented under Section 232, and the 
current steel orders. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of Section 232 
under the nondelegation doctrine. Part IV assesses potential challenges to the 
steel order under the theory that the President acted outside of the scope of 
 
Enforcement, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2019/02/07/ 
lighthizer-proposes-use-of-section-301-for-usmca-enforcement-505384. 
 21. David Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 81, 98–101 (2013). 
 22. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (2018). 
 23. Paul Kahn & Kiel Brennan Marquez, National Emergency Funding of Border Wall Is 
Unconstitutional, THE HILL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/433923-national-
emergency-funding-of-border-wall-is-unconstitutional. 
 24. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2018). 
 25. Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The Legal Authority Behind Trump’s New Tariffs on 
Mexico, LAWFARE (June 3, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-
trumps-new-tariffs-mexico. 
 26. See A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers (“The Brennan Center, building on previous 
research, has identified 123 statutory powers that may become available to the president when he declares 
a national emergency . . . [a]n additional 13 statutory powers become available when a national 
emergency is declared by Congress.”). 
 27. For the purposes of this note, the aluminum and other Section 232 investigations will not be 
analyzed. 
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his authority conferred by the statute. Part V assesses whether the action is 
consistent with global trade rules and what the potential effects of a WTO 
violation are under domestic law. Lastly, because of the weakness of the 
legal arguments against Section 232 generally and this steel order 
specifically, Part VI provides recommendations for how Congress, as 
opposed to the courts, might deal with the problems posed by Section 232. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Development of Section 232 
National security justifications for violations of trade commitments or 
as a basis for trade policy are not new. Even the original GATT agreement 
contains an exception for what would otherwise be treaty violations for 
essential national security interests.28 In U.S. domestic law, national security 
exceptions to tariff rates were initially addressed in the Trade Agreements 
Extension Act of 1954 (TAEA).29 In the TAEA, the President’s authority to 
enter into trade agreements to decrease duties was conditional. In any new 
agreements, the President would have to negotiate for the ability to withdraw 
any duty decreases if he found that domestic production’s capability of 
meeting projected national defense requirements was threatened.30 This 
provision essentially required any new trade agreements to have a “national 
defense requirements” exception. 
The TAEA was amended in 1955 to add the ability to restrict imports 
in addition to removing or limiting a favorable duty, if such articles 
threatened to impair the national security.31 In 1958, the TAEA was further 
amended by adding factors for officials to consider when making national 
security judgments.32 In the aftermath of the Korean War and in the wake of 
rising Cold War tensions, the importance and awareness of military readiness 
 
 28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 29. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-464, 68 Stat. 360 (July 1, 1954) 
(amended 1955). This agreement extended the President’s ability to enter into foreign trade agreements 
pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 
 30. Id. § 2 (“No action shall be taken pursuant . . . to decrease the duty of any article if the President 
find that such reduction would threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense 
requirements.”). 
 31. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-86, 69 Stat. 162 (June 21, 1955) 
(amended 1958) (adding in power to restrict imports if advised by the Director of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization and agreed to by the President, if the quantity of imports threatens to impair the national 
security). 
 32. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673 (1958) (adding 
factors to be considered, such as the “close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national 
security”). 
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increased.33 The legislative history of the amendment indicates this power 
was meant to serve as a stopgap to maintaining U.S. military dominance.34 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA) reaffirmed these preceding 
laws in Section 232.35 Section 232 provides that if the President concurs with 
the Secretary of Commerce that “an article is being imported into the U.S. in 
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security” the President shall “determine the nature and duration of 
the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the 
imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten 
to impair the national security.”36 The language of Section 232 has largely 
remained the same, except for changes to the process for recommendation of 
action to the President and who can weigh in on the debate.37 The statute has 
also been amended to specifically address oil imports.38 Section 232 of the 
TEA is the authority President Trump has invoked for the recent steel 
tariffs.39 
The history of the national security exception shows that, since the 1955 
amendments, the national security exception is broader than merely ensuring 
national defense requirements. The House Report to the 1955 amendment 
indicates that Congress wanted to ensure that the United States could 
preserve its essential security sectors.40 Additionally, the 1958 amendment 
adding as a factor the relationship between the economy and national 
security in assessing threats to national security shows that domestic 
economic health is a legitimate consideration. However, this history is not 
conclusive as to what the scope of “threaten to impair the national security” 
is or how imminent the threat to impair the national security should be to 
justify action taken under the statute. 
 
 33. Joanne Thornton, Section 232: U.S. Trade and National Security, GLOB. BUS. DIALOGUE (July 
3, 2018), https://www.gbdinc.org/section-232-u-s-trade-and-national-security/; see also RACHEL F. 
FEFER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 1 (2019) (“Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues 
were at the forefront of national debate.”). 
 34. H. R. REP. NO. 84-50, at 2095 (1955) (declaring “the world is divided into two armed camps” 
and that it was important to “preserve essential security sectors”). Also, much of the testimony came from 
domestic industry complaining they were being weakened by competition and were needed for national 
security. However, the testimony of the Secretary of Defense emphasized the need for strong economic 
relationships with our allies to dissuade them from falling behind the iron curtain. Id. at 2077. 
 35. H. R. REP. NO. 87-818, at 20, 44 (1962). 
 36. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). 
 37. Thornton, supra note 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (Mar. 28, 2018). 
 40. H. R. REP. NO. 84-50 at 2095 (1955) (declaring “the world is divided into two armed camps” 
and that the amendment was important to “preserve essential security sectors”). 
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B. How Section 232 Investigations Work 
A Section 232 investigation can be initiated in three ways: (1) upon 
request of the head of any department or agency, (2) upon application of an 
interested party, or (3) upon the Secretary of Commerce’s (Secretary) own 
motion.41 Once requested in writing, the Secretary “shall immediately 
initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national 
security of imports” of the product of interest.42 The Secretary must also 
immediately notify the Secretary of Defense of the investigation.43 During 
the course of the investigation, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) 
must consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding “methodological and 
policy questions,” seek information and advice from appropriate officers of 
the United States, and if appropriate, hold public hearings or afford interested 
parties an opportunity to present relevant advice and information after 
reasonable notice.44 The Secretary may also request from the Secretary of 
Defense an assessment of defense requirements for materials under 
investigation.45 
No later than 270 days after the initiation of an investigation, the 
Secretary shall submit a report of his findings to the President with respect 
to the effect of importation of said articles on the national security and make 
a recommendation based on such findings.46 The Bureau of Industry and 
Security (BIS) at Commerce conducts the investigation in accordance with 
the regulations codified in 15 C.F.R. § 705. 
Within ninety days of receiving a report where the Secretary has found 
that imports under current quantities and circumstances threaten to impair 
the national security, the President must: (1) determine whether he agrees 
with the Secretary’s finding, and (2) in the event of agreement, the President 
must determine the nature and duration of the action needed to adjust imports 
so they will not threaten to impair the national security.47 Once the President 
decides he agrees with the Secretary and will take action, he must do so 
within fifteen days.48 Within thirty days of his determination, the President 
shall submit to Congress a written statement of the reasons why the President 
has decided to take or has refused to take action.49 
 
 41. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A). 
 42. Id. § 1862(b)(1)(A). 
 43. Id. § 1862(b)(1)(B). 
 44. Id. § 1862(b)(2)(A). 
 45. Id. § 1862(b)(2)(B). 
 46. Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 
 47. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A). 
 48. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). 
 49. Id. § 1862(c)(2). 
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C. Previous Use of 232 
Prior to the current administration, twenty-six investigations have been 
initiated under Section 232.50 Of those initiated investigations, only eight 
determined the import threatened to impair the national security, and in only 
five of those cases did the President decide to take action.51 In all of these 
cases, the product identified was related to petroleum or crude oil.52 Action 
taken under 19 U.S.C. § 1862(f), the part of Section 232 which deals with 
oil imports, is subject to a congressional disapproval resolution.53 This part 
of the statute was added after a controversy in 1980 where Congress was 
upset over the President’s remedies on petroleum products.54 
The most recent investigation by Commerce was not the first Section 
232 investigation conducted on steel products. On February 1, 2001, 
Commerce initiated an investigation into iron ore and semi-finished steel,55 
similar to the current imports under investigation, “steel mill articles.”56 
Commerce concluded this investigation on October 29, 2001, and did not 
recommend President George W. Bush take any action.57 
In its report to the President, Commerce found it necessary to resolve 
three questions in determining whether a particular import threatens to 
impair the national security: (1) what constitutes “national security” (2) what 
effects should be considered, and (3) at what point do the imported products 
“threaten to impair” the national security?58 Commerce chose to read these 
questions of scope as broadly as they thought the statute allowed.59 
Commerce decided that both national defense requirements and “the general 
security and welfare of certain industries . . . that are critical to the minimum 
operations of the economy and government” are included in the term 
 
 50. FEFER, supra note 15, at 1. 
 51. Id. at 2. 
 52. Id. Two of these determinations were a part of the Mandatory Oil Import Program outside of 
the Section 232 Scheme, and another determination was held illegal by a federal court, resulting in only 
two instances where Section 232 investigations truly resulted in action. Id. 
 53. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(f). This resolution could be vetoed by the President, unless the resolution was 
supported by more than two-thirds of each house. 
 54. FEFER, supra note 15, at 1. 
 55. Bureau of Export Administration, Initiation of National Security Investigation of Imports of Ore 
and Semi-Finished Steel, 66 Fed. Reg. 9,067 (Feb. 6, 2001). 
 56. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
 57. Bureau of Export Administration, Report on the Effect of Imports on Iron Ore and Semi-
Finished Steel on the National Security, 67 Fed. Reg. 1,958 (Jan. 15, 2002). 
 58. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF EXP. ADMIN., THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF IRON ORE 
AND SEMI-FINISHED STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 4 (2001). 
 59. See id. at 7 (“[O]n each of a series of issues related to the scope . . . the Department has 
interpreted the requirements of Section 232 in the manner most likely to result in a positive finding.”). 
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“national security” for this investigation.60 Commerce did recognize that in 
some cases only including national defense requirements in national security 
may be appropriate. Commerce also considered all of the factors listed in 19 
U.S.C. § 1862(d) for the “effects” of imports, such as projected defense 
requirements; capacity of the domestic industry; existing and anticipated 
resources; growth requirements for such industries; and the quantity, 
character, and use of the imported goods.61 To meet the “threaten to impair” 
threshold, Commerce thought the imports must either lead to U.S. 
dependence on unsafe or unreliable imports, or fundamentally threaten the 
ability of U.S. domestic industries to satisfy security needs.62 
The Secretary found iron important to U.S. national security since those 
materials are needed for certain uses by the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and by industries critical to the minimum operations of the U.S. economy. 
Because these “critical” amounts were low and did not require dependence 
on unreliable foreign sources or shrink the domestic industry to a size unable 
to support defense requirements, the Secretary did not recommend action.63 
This decision accounted for increased military needs in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.64  
D. Current Steel Order 
On April 19, 2017, Wilbur Ross, the Secretary of Commerce, initiated 
an investigation under Section 232 to determine the effects of steel imports 
on the national security.65 Secretary Ross notified then-Secretary of Defense, 
James Mattis, of the investigation.66 The following day, the President 
requested an expeditious investigation and that Commerce include 
recommendations for specific actions if the imports were found to threaten 
to impair the national security.67 Commerce requested public comments, and 
a public hearing was held on May 24, 2017.68 The panel at the hearing 
included representatives from the public sector; foreign and domestic 
 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. Id. at 6. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. Id. at 1. 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Notice Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security 
Investigation of Imports of Steel, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,205 (Apr. 26, 2017). 
 66. Letter from Sec’y of Commerce to the Sec’y of Def. (Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Department 
of Commerce). 
 67. Admin. Memorandum from Admin. of Donald J. Trump to Sec’y of Commerce on Steel Imports 
and Threats to National Security DCPD201700259 (Apr. 20, 2017) (on file with Government Publishing 
Office). 
 68. Notice Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security 
Investigation of Imports of Steel, 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,205. 
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government; and the private sector, including domestic producers, importers, 
and foreign producers.69 Commerce also held discussions with other 
departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, the Department 
of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior/U.S. Geological Survey, the 
Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), and the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative.70 
Commerce released the results of its investigation on January 11, 
2018.71 The report claims to adopt the statutory interpretation analysis used 
in the 2001 Steel Report.72 However, Commerce adopted a construction of 
the statute that was even broader than the 2001 Steel Report determined was 
possible.73 Specifically, for the “threaten to impair” analysis, Commerce 
disagreed with the 2001 determination that threats to the viability of critical 
industry must be “fundamental” to threaten to impair the national security.74 
As for the findings, the Secretary determined that steel is important to 
national security because of its use in defense and critical infrastructure 
systems, like transportation, water, electricity, and other power generation 
systems.75 The Secretary concluded that the current quantity of imports 
adversely impacted the economic viability of the domestic steel industry,76 
which in turn seriously weakens our internal economy.77 The Secretary found 
that domestic steel production capacity was essential for the national security 
of the United States,78 as confirmed by Congress’s statement that “the 
security of the United States is dependent on the ability of the domestic 
industrial base to supply materials and services.”79 
The Secretary first recommended either a global quota at sixty-three 
percent of current imports, applied on a country and steel specific basis, or a 
global tariff of twenty-four percent to achieve eighty percent production 
 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STEEL 232 INVESTIGATION PUBLIC HEARING (2017). 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY 20 (2018). 
 71. Id. at 1. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN., supra note 58, at 7 (“[O]n each of 
a series of issues related to the scope . . . the Department has interpreted the requirements of Section 232 
in the manner most likely to result in a positive finding.”). 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., supra note 70, at 14 n.15 (dropping 
“fundamentally” from the threat to critical industry viability under the threaten to impair analysis). 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. Id. at 4. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. at n.5 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 4502(a)). 
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capacity utilization of the domestic industry.80 As a second alternative, the 
Secretary recommended applying a fifty-three percent tariff on Brazil, South 
Korea, Russia, Turkey, India, Vietnam, China, Thailand, South Africa, 
Egypt, Malaysia, and Costa Rica and limiting other countries’ imports to 
their 2017 levels.81 This alternative would achieve an eighty percent 
domestic capacity utilization while only placing tariffs on steel from nations 
where less than four percent of U.S. steel is exported, potentially decreasing 
the risk of retaliation on U.S. steel exports.82 Lastly, the Secretary 
recommended an exclusions appeals process for products lacking 
comparable domestic production and for specific national security based 
considerations.83 
In a memorandum to Commerce after the release of the report, the 
Secretary of Defense agreed with Commerce’s determination that unfair 
trade practices pose a risk to national security by eroding the United States’ 
innovation and manufacturing industrial base.84 However, Secretary Mattis 
also reminded Commerce that the U.S. military requirements for steel only 
amount to three percent of U.S. production and that the findings in the report 
would not impact the ability of the DOD to supply its defense programs.85 
The Secretary of Defense expressed security concerns with the solutions 
recommended by Commerce, namely from potential negative impacts 
among key allies.86 Rather than a global quota or tariff, the DOD 
recommended targeted tariffs and cooperation with trade partners to work on 
addressing the underlying issues of market distortion through unfair trade 
practices, namely Chinese transshipment, overproduction, and 
circumvention of tariffs.87 Overall, the Secretary of Defense seemed 
concerned that our actions would alienate our allies.88 
The 2018 Report listed several changes in the steel market since 2001 
that explain the different result from the 2001 investigation. These include 
that the 2018 investigation is on steel rather than iron ore and semi-finished 
steel, the increased level of global excess capacity, the increased level of 
 
 80. Id. at 7–8. 
 81. Id. at 8. 
 82. Id. at 8–9. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense to the Sec’y of Commerce on Response to Steel and 
Aluminum Policy Recommendations (Feb. 22, 2018) (on file with author). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. (“This is an important opportunity to set clear expectations domestically regarding 
competitiveness and rebuild economic strength at home . . . [i]t is critical we reinforce to our key allies 
that these actions are focused on correcting Chinese [actions] . . . not the bilateral U.S. relationship.”). 
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imports, the reduction in basic oxygen furnace facilities, and the potential 
plant closures’ effect on necessary capacity for a national emergency.89 
Notably, Commerce identified consumption in critical industries had 
increased from 33.68 million short tons in 1997 to roughly 59 million short 
tons in 2007.90 The definition of critical industry sectors also changed 
between the two reports.91 Total domestic production of steel has remained 
fairly stagnant.92 While there have been changes between 2001 and 2018, a 
factor that is heavily focused on in the 2018 Report, capacity utilization, has 
not changed significantly from what Commerce was considering in 2001.93 
This seems especially relevant since the threat to viability of the domestic 
industry is the main justification for a national security concern.94 Whether 
conditions are sufficiently different to justify the complete change in 
outcome between the 2001 and the 2018 investigations is debatable. 
On March 8, 2018, the President issued a proclamation imposing a 
twenty-five percent duty on U.S. imports of steel products with opportunity 
to apply for country and product specific exemptions.95 Several changes to 
the order’s applicability were made through temporary exclusions.96 By June 
2018, the twenty-five percent tariff applied to all nations, except for 
Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea, who negotiated quota agreements.97 The 
President temporarily increased the tariff rate to fifty percent against steel 
 
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., supra note 70, at 5. 
 90.  Id. at 27 (54 million metric tons). 
 91.  Compare id., at app. I (2018) (listing sixteen “broad” sectors like “energy”) with U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN., supra note 58, at 16–17 (listing twenty-eight “narrower” 
industries like “crude petroleum and natural gas” and “electric services”). The breakdown of contributions 
to critical structure steel demand by sector is not provided in the 2018 Report making a comparison 
difficult. 
 92.  Production of raw steel was 112.2 million net tons (roughly 102 million metric tons) in 2000, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN.¸ supra note 58, at 19, and 114.3 million metric 
tons (126 million short tons) from 2006-2016 according to the OECD, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE 
BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., supra note 70, at 41. 
 93.  The Department seemed unconcerned with a capacity utilization rate ranging from 72.2%–
73.8% in 2001, even though capacity levels had been higher in 2000 (91.6% the first half of the year and 
79.9% the second half of the year). Id. at 17, 19. See also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT 
ADMIN., supra note 58, at 17, 19 (recommending the President not take action under section 232, 
notwithstanding, capacity utilization ranging between 72.2% percent and 73.8% percent). The average 
capacity utilization rate from 2011-2016 was seventy-four percent and the projected rate for 2017 was 
72.3%. Id. at 7. The Department determined that a capacity utilization rate of eighty percent was needed 
for sustained health. Id. at 4. 
 94.  The domestic industry asserts and the Department concurred that a capacity utilization rate of 
eighty percent is needed for sustained health. Id. at 4, 47. 
 95.  Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
 96.  FEFER, supra note 33, at 7. 
 97.  Id. at 8. 
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imports from Turkey.98 Australia has also been excluded from the twenty-
five percent tariff, but without any alternative agreement.99 The President 
announced in early December 2019 that he would reimpose the Section 232 
steel tariffs against Brazil and Argentina because of currency 
manipulation.100 However, no notice has been posted in the federal register 
indicating the adjustment. Canada and Mexico have also been exempted 
from the Section 232 tariffs.101 According to Congressional Research 
Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has collected $4.7 billion 
dollars from the steel tariff as of March 28, 2019.102 Due to fears of 
circumvention, the President has extended the Section 232 tariffs to 
derivative articles of steel (and aluminum), effective February 8, 2020.103 
The expansive reading of the statute and the differing results from the 
2001 report have only furthered suspicions that the determination is either 
contrary to law or an abuse of discretion. However, Commerce did give 
reasons for the differing conclusions between the two investigations. 
Furthermore, the legislative history and language of the statute, as discussed 
in Part II.A, do not clearly require a narrow interpretation or shed significant 
light on the meaning of “threaten to impair the national security.” 
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF POWER? 
Under current jurisprudence, Section 232 is unlikely to violate the 
nondelegation doctrine. Rooted in separation of powers principles and as an 
Article I, § 1 limit,104 the Supreme Court has determined that Congress 
cannot abdicate its legislative power.105 However, this does not deny 
Congress “flexibility and practicality” in obtaining assistance from the other 
branches.106 A delegation is permissible where Congress lays down an 
“intelligible principle,” or legal standard, to which the delegated action must 
conform.107 
The Court has not struck down a statute for violation of the 
 
 98.  Proclamation No. 9772, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,429 (Aug. 15, 2018); Proclamation No. 9886, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 23,421 (May 21, 2019). 
 99.  FEFER, supra note 33, at 12. 
 100.  Mount Tariff Erupts Again, supra note 2. 
 101.  Proclamation No. 9894, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,987, 23,988 (May 19, 2019). 
 102.  FEFER, supra note 33, at 12. 
 103.  Proclamation No. 9980, 85 Fed. Reg. 5,281 (Jan. 29, 2020). 
 104.  “[A]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 105.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). 
 106.  Id. at 530. 
 107.  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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nondelegation doctrine since 1935.108 There are two cases where the Court 
deemed legislation unconstitutional under the doctrine. These cases are 
Panama Refining Co., where the statutory grant had no guidance whatsoever, 
and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., where the delegation of authority had 
little guidance, was partially abdicated to private corporations, and was 
broad enough in scope to regulate the entire economy.109 The Court has 
upheld extremely broad statutory grants since 1935,110 leading many scholars 
to deem the nondelegation doctrine “dead.”111 But the concerns behind the 
nondelegation doctrine have been reborn and enforced in other forms, such 
as through increased procedural and rationalization requirements of 
agencies112 and canons of statutory construction.113 
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the nondelegation doctrine 
in Gundy v. United States.114 Gundy challenged the constitutionality of § 
20913(d) of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 
which provides that: 
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability 
of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before 
the enactment of this chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration 
of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who 
are unable to comply with [registration requirements].115 
Gundy argued that authorizing the Attorney General “to specify the 
applicability” of SORNA’s requirements is an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.116 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices 
Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, affirmed the need of an intelligible 
principle.117 The plurality agreed with Gundy that if SORNA “grants to the 
 
 108.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495; see generally Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 109. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). 
 110. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (upholding 
a delegation to regulate broadcasting licensing “as public interest, convenience, or necessity require”). 
 111. See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro & Richard Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
387, 400 n.48 (citing FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power of Congress to delegate 
authority to administrative agencies . . . has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical 
purposes.”)). 
 112. Id. at 413; see generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq. (2018). 
 113. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L.R. 315 (2000). This point 
is explored further in infra, Part IV. 
 114. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2120 (2019). 
 115. Id. at 2122. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2123. 
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Attorney General plenary power to determine SORNA’s applicability . . . 
and to change her policy for any reason at any time” that there would be a 
nondelegation question.118 However, the plurality disagreed with Gundy’s 
reading of SORNA. The plurality interpreted the meaning of the statute, in 
light of the text, context, purpose, and history, “to require the Attorney 
General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible” and 
providing that the “Attorney General’s discretion extends only to 
considering and addressing feasibility issues.”119 In its nondelegation 
analysis, the plurality assessed whether Congress made clear its general 
policy and the boundary of the delegee’s authority, acknowledging that these 
standards are not demanding.120 The plurality determined that Congress’s 
policy was for the Attorney General to require pre-Act offenders to register 
“as soon as feasible” and that discretion was limited to feasibility issues that 
were administrative and transitional in nature.121 The plurality thought that 
if this delegation was unconstitutional, “then most of Government is 
unconstitutional.”122 
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas in 
dissent, found that § 20913(d) does delegate legislative authority to the 
Attorney General in violation of the Constitution. The dissent believes the 
majority “reimagines the terms of the statute.”123 The dissent argued SORNA 
grants vast authority to the Attorney General, essentially giving him “free 
rein” to fashion rules for nearly all existing sex offenders.124 Looking at the 
history of nondelegation, the dissent determined that the courts incorrectly 
strayed from a more traditional separation-of-powers analysis to the 
“intelligible principle misadventure.”125 Rather than look for an intelligible 
principle, the dissent would allow delegations where: (1) “Congress makes 
the policy decisions regulating private conduct” and allows another branch 
to “fill up the details,”126 (2) Congress conditions the application of a rule 
governing private conduct on executive fact-finding,127 or (3) Congress 
assigns the other branches “non-legislative responsibilities” where “the 
 
 118. Id. 
 119.  Id. at 2123–24. 
 120.  Id. at 2129. 
 121.  Id. at 2129–30. 
 122.  Id. at 2130. 
 123.  Id. at 2131. 
 124.  Id. at 2132 (claiming SORNA does not require the AG to register pre-Act offenders within a 
certain time frame, or even at all, which allows the AG to impose some but not all of the requirements, 
and permits the AG to change his mind at any given time). 
 125.  Id. at 2141. 
 126.  Id. at 2136. 
 127.  Id. 
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discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of the 
executive branch.”128 The dissent argued that the intelligible principle test is 
unbounded from constitutional principles and has already required 
corrections such as the major questions doctrine and void for vagueness.129 
The Justices hoped that the Court would pick up the issue again and provide 
more meaningful limits to keep delegations from “running riot.”130 
In a brief concurrence, Justice Alito affirmed the constitutionality of § 
20913(d), claiming that under the Court’s current approach “it would be 
freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”131 
Justice Alito stated that, if the majority of the Court were willing, he would 
support an effort “to reconsider the approach we have taken” to the 
nondelegation doctrine.132 Justice Kavanaugh has indicated his willingness 
to reassess the Court’s approach to delegation.133 Writing separately in a 
denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, Justice Kavanaugh recalled Justice 
Rehnquist opining that major national policy decisions should be made via 
congressional legislation, not delegations to the Executive Branch. With 
Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, there would be enough members of the Court 
willing to reconsider the current intelligible principle test for delegation 
challenges. 
A. Unfavorable Precedent 
The CIT’s recent decision in American Institute for International Steel 
is unsurprising under current precedent.134 The AIIS filed a lawsuit at the 
CIT seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Section 
232 on the grounds that the section delegates legislative authority in violation 
of separation of powers.135 Section 232 was enacted under Congress’s 
“[p]ower to lay and collect [t]axes, [d]uties, [i]mposts, and [e]xcises” and 
“[t]o regulate [c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations.”136 AIIS argues that there 
is no meaningful intelligible principle reining in this delegation of legislative 
power.137 The only restraint in the statute is a determination of “national 
security,” which is not defined. Additionally, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) provides 
 
 128.  Id. at 2137. For example, Congress delegating procedural rule making power to the courts or 
foreign affairs powers to the President. 
 129. Id. at 2141–42. 
 130. Id. at 2148. 
 131. Id. at 2131. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Paul v. United States, 718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 134. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). 
 135. Complaint at 1, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (No. 18-00152). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 1, 2. 
 137. Complaint, supra note 135, at 7. 
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limitless considerations—essentially anything in the national economy 
affected by imports—for determining whether the national security has been 
threatened.138 Not only is the definition of national security broad, but so are 
the remedial actions available to the President.139 As evidenced by the 
current steel order, the “national security interest” need only be remote, not 
imminent, to justify significant action that affects large swaths of the 
economy (assuming, of course, the orders are valid under the statute).140 
The Court has upheld delegations of power with vague, malleable 
“limiting” principles that are not far off from Section 232.141 But in these 
cases, the “width” of the power was more limited.142 The Supreme Court has 
given some weight to the scope, as opposed to the depth, of delegations of 
power.143 Because the scope of industries subjected to Section 232 is 
numerous and imports make up a substantial part of the economy, the Court 
might have reason to require a narrower delegation.144 Having a large swath 
of the economy subjected to nearly unfettered discretion by the President is, 
under separation of powers principles, problematic.145 The Court has not 
 
 138. Id. at 5. 
 139. Id. at 5–6. 
 140. See id. at 9–12 (describing the circumstances under which the orders came to fruition); Brinkley, 
supra note 2; Greg Ip, The Flaw in Trump’s National Security Tariffs Logic, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2018, 
11:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-flaw-in-trumps-national-security-tariffs-logic-
1520612895. 
 141. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (determining that setting 
nationwide air-quality standards limiting pollution to the level required “to protect the public health” as 
an adequate intelligible principle); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423–26 (1994) (upholding 
a wartime conferral of agency power to fix prices of commodities at a level that “will be generally fair 
and equitable and will effectuate [the purposes of the] Act”). 
 142. Whitman covered setting air quality standards for ambient air pollutants, see Whitman, 531 U.S. 
at 462, which affects industrial plants and moving vehicle manufacturers, EPA, Clean Air Act 
Requirements and History, EPA: CLEAN AIR ACT OVERVIEW, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-
overview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). Yakus only applied during 
wartime and to commodities prices. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 420, 423–26. 
 143. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935) (“[T]his authority 
relates to a host of different trades and industries, thus extending the President’s discretion to . . . the vast 
array of commercial and industrial activities throughout the country. Such a sweeping delegation of 
legislative power finds no support in the decisions upon which the government especially relies.”) 
 144. In the last twelve years imports as a percent of GDP have ranged from 13.75% to 17.43%. Erin 
Duffin, U.S. Imports as a Percentage of GDP 1990–2017, STATISTA (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/259096/us-imports-as-a-percentage-of-gdp/. See also Transcript at 24, 
33, 44, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (showing 
the Government skirting the question of whether peanut butter could be an industry considered under the 
language of the statute). 
 145. “But Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered 
discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and 
expansion of trade or industry.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 537–38 (citing Pan. Ref. Co. 
v. Ryan, 239 U.S. 388 (1935)). 
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outright said that this is a determinative factor of the nondelegation doctrine, 
and the authority conferred here has less of an impact than the National 
Industrial Recovery Act did in A.L.A. Schechter, a delegation the Court did 
strike down. 
Other than the general lack of stringent enforcement of the intelligible 
principle requirement, AIIS has fought an uphill battle to distinguish Federal 
Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG Inc., where the Supreme Court 
stated that Section 232’s standards are “clearly sufficient to meet any 
delegation doctrine attack.”146 Algonquin involved a challenge to the 
President implementing license fees for oil imports. The crux of the 
challenge was that non-direct import controls (pretty much any control other 
than quotas) were beyond the scope of the statute.147 Among other 
arguments, the respondents contended that reading the statute to allow for 
any remedy would invoke a serious question of an unconstitutional 
delegation.148 The Court thought that the limitations provided were sufficient 
to absolve any question of delegation. There is a precondition for action 
(“article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under 
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security”) and a limit 
on the size of the remedy (the President could “act only to the extent ‘he 
deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so 
that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security’”).149 
AIIS tries to distinguish Algonquin on several grounds. First, AIIS 
argues the ruling on the issue of nondelegation was mere dicta, since the case 
was ultimately decided on the theory that the statute permitted such licensing 
fees.150 The CIT rejected this argument because the Court addressed the issue 
square on.151 Second, AIIS argues that the availability of judicial review has 
been drastically reduced since the time the case was decided.152 The CIT also 
rejected this argument saying that courts both before and after Algonquin 
have ruled that decisions committed to presidential discretion are 
unreviewable outside of challenges to unconstitutionality or acting in excess 
of statutorily granted authority.153 The CIT did express concern that the 
courts would not be able to determine if the motivating reason for a 
 
 146. FEA v. Algonquin SNG Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). 
 147. Id. at 556. 
 148. Id. at 558–59. 
 149. Id. at 559. 
 150. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 29, Am. Inst. for Int’l 
Steel v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (No. 18-00152). 
 151. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019). 
 152. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 29–
31. 
 153. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1341–42. 
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President’s use of this statute would be national security, but that the decision 
in Algonquin made alleviating such concerns outside of a lower court’s 
power.154 
B. Separation of Powers as a Driver for Nondelegation 
The Gundy dissent’s critique of the insufficiency of the intelligible 
principle doctrine is neither new nor unique.155 Judge Katzman in AIIS filed 
a separate opinion to express his reservations about the nondelegation 
doctrine.156 There have also been several academic articles written on 
possible alternatives to the intelligible principle doctrine.157 
The Court could unify its delegation jurisprudence with its typical 
separation of powers jurisprudence. There is no clear test for determining a 
violation of separation of powers, and the approach towards making such 
determinations has vacillated between “formalist”158 and “functionalist”159 
approaches. 
A formalist separation of powers approach to delegation would 
probably create a result similar to the Gundy dissent. The courts would need 
to characterize legislative power. The Gundy dissent saw “legislative power” 
as the “power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future 
actions by private persons.”160 Congress would need to “make[] the policy 
 
 154. Id. at 1344–45. 
 155. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1232–33 (1994) (“For those of us for whom the written Constitution (as validly amended) is the only 
Constitution, the seemingly irrevocable entrenchment of the post-New Deal structure of national 
governance raises serious doubts about the utility of constitutional discourse.”). 
 156. Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1346 (Katzmann, J., dubitante). 
 157. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) (recommending that “goal” statutes that do not specify how private conduct 
should be constrained should be unconstitutional); Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181 (2018) (recommending that the Courts require clearer statutory 
authorization for agency action). 
 158. Formalism favors bright-line rules, the constitutional text, and emphasizes separation of powers. 
Formalist claims tend to argue either one branch is exercising another’s power or that a branch is violating 
constitutional requirements for that action. William Eskridge, Jr., Relationship Between Formalism and 
Functionalism in Separation of Powers, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998). See also Clinton 
v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (determining the President was exercising legislative power); 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (deciding Congress did not meet 
all of the preconditions necessary for action that was, in effect, legislation). 
 159. Functionalism emphasizes constitutional policy, constitutional practice, pragmatic values, 
balancing tests, and the checks and balances aspect of a multi-branch government. Eskridge, supra note 
158 at 21–22. A functionalist approach focuses more on whether action by one branch is aggrandizing 
power, encroaching on another branch’s power, or diluting the power of another branch. See, e.g., 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (J. White, dissenting); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizures), 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (J. Jackson, concurrence). 
 160. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
SCOTT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:07 PM 
2020] STEEL STANDING: WHAT’S NEXT FOR SECTION 232? 399 
decisions when regulating private conduct,” but could allow another branch 
to “fill up the details” and “make certain alterations and additions,” 
especially on issues of lesser interest.161 Likewise, Congress could make 
legislative acts conditional on certain factual findings made by the executive. 
Congress would make the major policy decision of what and when action 
should be regulated, only leaving to the executive to find whether certain 
facts exist warranting the application of such laws.162 The Gundy dissent also 
recognized that there are some overlapping powers between the branches. In 
cases where another branch already poses some independent power, 
congressional statutes conferring wide discretion on that branch on that 
matter would not pose a separation of powers problem.163 Therefore, 
Congress’s statutory delegations of discretion regarding foreign affairs or 
commander in chief powers to the executive would not be quite as 
problematic as delegations regarding Congress’s interstate commerce 
powers. 
A functionalist approach would likely focus on how certain delegations 
would upset the balance of power between the branches rather than create 
general categories of permissible delegations. The underlying reasons of 
why legislative power was housed in the Congress, such as a desire for 
protecting liberty, deliberation, and minority rights and maintaining stability 
and fair notice,164 are crucial factors for assessing whether a delegation is 
permissible. When not subject to procedural protections such as notice and 
comment or judicial review, wide delegations of authority to a single party 
branch could result in a lack of deliberation, stability, and fair notice and 
threaten minority rights and interests. 
Nevertheless, changing the intelligible principle test could have many 
negative effects. For example, a number of congressional delegations valid 
under the relaxed intelligible principle test would not survive a stricter 
nondelegation analysis. As long acknowledged by the Court, Congress often 
relies on the executive branch to carry out the functions of modern 
government.165 By prohibiting some of these delegations, such a decision 
could upset many of the current powers held by administrative agencies or 
the President. 
 
 161. Id. at 2136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 2137. 
 164. Id. at 2134–35. 
 165. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“Congress has found it 
frequently necessary to use officers of the executive branch . . . .”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.”). 
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Another potential negative effect to strengthening delegation analysis 
would be that such a decision could threaten the Court’s legitimacy. The few 
times the Court has struck down statutes delegating power was during the 
Lochner-era.166 Counter-majoritarian concerns and a fear that the Court is 
reading too much into the Article I vesting clause may counsel against 
changing the Court’s analysis. The Court may fear that it lacks political 
capital to dismantle the practice of vast delegations, a practice that Congress 
may not let go of easily.167 The Court might also hesitate to expend political 
capital on policing voluntary abdications of power, as is the case with 
nondelegation, as opposed to forceful aggrandizement or encroachment of 
power, if its capital is so limited. 
On the other hand, the Court’s legitimacy may also be undermined by 
its current nondelegation jurisprudence. This is especially true if the rationale 
for virtually abandoning the nondelegation principle is not based on the 
Constitution. Some claim the Court’s abandonment is based on a belief “that 
the modern administrative state could not function if Congress were actually 
required to make a significant percentage of the fundamental policy 
decisions.”168 If this is the Court’s true rationale, then the Court is ignoring 
the Constitution, despite the Court’s duty to apply the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land.169 Rather than deciding on the basis of law, the 
Court would be deciding the issue on the basis of what it deems is good 
policy. 
C. Separation of Powers and Trade Policy 
In the trade sphere, academics have argued a need to reorient the current 
distribution of power between Congress and the Executive. Timothy Meyer 
and Ganesh Sitaraman, professors of law at Vanderbilt University Law 
School, have written about the unique relationship between trade law, policy, 
and separation of powers.170 They promote a dual paradigm for thinking of 
trade powers: the domestic economics paradigm and the foreign affairs 
paradigm.171 
 
 166. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2138. 
 167. Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a 
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (“Even if the Court were 
disposed to order the task of dismantling the federal bureaucracy, it might not have the political capital 
necessary to realize its objective.”). 
 168. Lawson, supra note 155, at 1241. 
 169. See id. (“When faced with a choice between the Constitution and the structure of modern 
governance, the Court has had no difficulty making the choice.”). 
 170. Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583 
(2019). 
 171. Id. 
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The domestic economics paradigm focuses on trade as an extension of 
the domestic economy.172 This idea is supported by the textual commitment 
of regulating foreign commerce and the laying of duties with Congress in its 
Article I, § 8 powers. Additionally, the Origination Clause, Article I, §7, that 
“all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives” 
suggests Congressional involvement would be needed to raise revenues 
through duties.173 Functionally, Congress has been the appropriate body for 
bargaining over economic policy, since virtually all economic interests are 
represented in Congress.174 
The foreign affairs paradigm has similar components to the economics 
paradigm.175 Rather than trade being an extension of economic policy, trade 
is part of the management of relationships with foreign nations and is, 
therefore, part of the foreign affairs power which is housed in both Articles 
I and II.176 Trade agreements with other nations can help build allies, punish 
those who deviate from foreign policy objectives, and set policies for the 
ground rules of global trade. Both branches have power over foreign 
relations, but many scholars argue there has been executive aggrandizement 
in foreign relations law, at least in areas of concurrent powers, or immense 
congressional abdication where Congress has delegated power to the 
President.177 There are functional benefits to housing foreign relations trade 
 
 172. Id. at 590. 
 173. Id.; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
2 (2013). 
 174. Meyer, supra note 170, at 591. 
 175. Id. at 597. 
 176. Id. at 597–98. The extent of the foreign affairs power constitutionally housed in the Executive 
is up for debate. There are a few express powers, such as the ability to send and receive ambassadors, to 
negotiate treaties, and the Commander-in-Chief power. But decisions by the Court have indicated the 
President has further, implied foreign affairs powers. In the realm of diplomacy, the Court has indicated 
that the President is the conduit for the United States’ “one voice” in foreign relations. See United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“In [external affairs] . . . the President alone 
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”); id. (“[The President] makes treaties 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 
U.S. 396, 424 (2003) (taking issue with a state law that “compromise[s] the very capacity of the President 
to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”). The need to manage relations 
with foreign governments is tied to the receiving and sending of ambassadors, the negotiation of treaties 
power, and the state recognition power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Zivotofsky v. Kerry 
(Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1059 (2015). Congress’s foreign affairs powers include laying and collection of 
duties, regulating foreign commerce, establishing rules for naturalization, defining and punishing offenses 
against the law of nations, declaring war, creating rules for capture of vessels, raising and supporting the 
army and navy, calling forth the militia to repel invasions, etc. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. The Senate also 
restrains the President’s power to appoint ambassadors and enter into treaties by requiring advice and 
consent. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1–2. 
 177. Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 315, 344 (2018) 
(citing Oona Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE 
L.J. 140, 144–45 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International 
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powers within the executive. For example, it would be near impossible for 
Congress to negotiate trade agreements—the (relatively) singular voice of 
the unitary executive is paramount for negotiating trade deals.178 Multiple 
voices and open negotiations may end up undermining the United States by 
forcing harsh positions that are politically popular but may alienate 
negotiating partners.179 There is also an argument that trade deals should not 
be made in secret, since this would be perceived as undemocratic.180 
Taking practice as an indicator, Congress exercised primacy over trade 
policy early in the history of the United States and up until the New Deal 
Era.181 In the late 1800s, Congress set up the Tariff Commission (now the 
ITC) and delegated authority to the executive to alter a limited number of 
tariff rates in the McKinley Tariff of 1890.182 This delegation was challenged 
as unconstitutional, but was upheld. The Supreme Court determined that the 
President was only executing a law passed by Congress, not exercising 
legislative power himself.183 This trend grew as Congress delegated more of 
the tariff-setting power to the President, subject to specific findings of facts 
and often limited in the levels of adjustment.184 Congress also had negative 
results in setting tariffs directly, such as with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 
1930, which was a complete economic disaster.185 Since Roosevelt’s 
presidency, much of the trade power has been placed in the hands of the 
President by Congress,186 though Congress has placed limits on trade 
agreement negotiation power to keep some control over the process of trade 
 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2018); Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of 
Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1003–04 (2013)). 
 178. See Claussen, supra note 177, at 319; Meyer, supra note 170, at 598. 
 179. John S. Odell & Dustin Tingley, Negotiating Agreements in International Relations, in JANE 
MANSBRIDGE & CATHIE JO MARTIN, POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 231, 254–55 (Brookings 
Inst. Press ed., 2015) (showing benefits of secret pre-negotiations with Japan regarding adjusting currency 
strength); see also id. at 250–51 (European Community negotiations). 
 180. Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
143, 171 (1992). 
 181. Meyer, supra note 170, at 596–97. 
 182. Id. at 594. 
 183. Id. at 595–96. This delegation was truly limited since it only covered a limited amount of 
products and the President had clear guidelines of when he could suspend the tariff reduction (only against 
a particular country if that country changed their tariff rate on the reciprocal U.S. product), and the only 
aspect of the action not specified by Congress was the duration of the suspension. Marshall Field & Co. 
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–93 (1892). 
 184. See Meyer, supra note 170, at 599 (discussing the Fordney McCumber Tariff of 1922 which 
provided for “flexible tariffs,” allowing the President to adjust rates by as much as fifty percent). 
 185. Id. at 600. 
 186. Id. at 601; CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44707, PRESIDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS AND DUTIES (2016); Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: 
The Changing Role of the Executive in U.S. Trade Lawmaking, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL & LEGAL STUD. 345 
(2017). 
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agreements.187 
The rationale for shifting from Congressional to increased Presidential 
control was rooted in liberalization and Congress’s increased susceptibility 
to protectionist policies. Meyer and Sitaraman argue that the shift is 
problematic because it focuses on the outcome of trade policy (liberalization) 
and not the underlying goals of trade policy (domestic economic objectives 
or foreign policy objectives).188 Additionally, the executive dominating the 
trade sphere to promote liberalization is not compelling since Presidents are 
also susceptible to strong special interest groups, especially those that 
dominate swing states.189 
Despite the international character of trade policy, Meyer and 
Sitaraman argue that justifications for foreign affairs exceptionalism, or “the 
view that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a 
different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than 
those that govern its domestic powers,”190 are not as strong in the trade 
context.191 Large domestic economic interests exist that the constitutional 
design contemplated belonging to Congress, beholden to local 
 
 187. Meyer, supra note 170, at 603–04. For more examples of congressional involvement in fast-
track negotiations, see id. at 642–44. For decisions of great importance at the WTO, see id. at 615–16 
(noting that this did not include membership accessions which, when an economy like China joins the 
WTO, have great impact). See also Claussen, supra note 177, at 329–38 (discussing fast-track 
procedures). 
 188. Meyer, supra note 170, at 651. 
 189. Id. at 628 (“[T]he President’s trade policy can be captured by interests just as parochial as those 
that capture Congress.”); see also Veronique de Rugy, How Special Interests Hide the True Costs of 
Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/opinion/tariffs-trump-trade-
special-interests.html (discussing steel executives’ “iron grip on the White House”—Secretary of 
Commerce Ross sat on a steel company’s board and made his wealth buying and selling steel companies, 
USTR Secretary Robert Lighthizer was the practice group head for Skadden’s International Trade group, 
and one of their biggest clients was U.S. Steel Corp., and the President’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, is 
a mercantilist whose documentary against trade with China was largely funded by Nucor Corporation, 
one of the largest domestic steel producers); Eric Boehm, Lobbyists Are Making Bank on Trump’s Steel 
Tariffs, REASON (Feb. 13, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/02/13/lobbyists-are-loving-trumps-steel-tariff/; 
SCOTT LINCICOME, CATO INSTITUTE, FREE TRADE BULLETIN NO. 72, at 9 (2018), https://www.cato.org/ 
publications/free-trade-bulletin/protectionist-moment-wasnt-american-views-trade-globalization 
(“Protectionist policies emanating from the United States government today are most likely a response . . . 
to discrete interest group lobbying (e.g., the U.S. steel industry) or influential segments of the U.S. voting 
population (e.g., steelworkers in Pennsylvania).”). 
 190. Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from 
“Exceptionalism,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 295 (2015). 
 191. The Court has used exceptionalism in trade cases when there are conflicts between the national 
and state governments, viewing such cases as foreign affairs cases. See Ernest A. Young, Dual 
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L.R. 139, 140–
41 (2001) (discussing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) and United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)). 
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constituencies, not the executive.192 Also, the main justifications for foreign 
affairs exceptionalism for the executive—secrecy and speed—are less 
critical in the trade sphere. Economic agreements neither need to be nor 
should be secret, and foreign economic issues are no different from domestic 
economic issues regarding the need for quick action.193 
The typical argument for why the President is in the best situation for 
dictating international trade policy is that he can represent utilitarian national 
interests in opening trade, since trade liberalization increases total economic 
wealth.194 However, this conventional wisdom has proven misguided in the 
Trump presidency. The arguable capture of the White House by the steel 
industry195 is even more concerning than it would be if a congressional 
committee or a few members of Congress were captured. In Congress, the 
competing special interests of downstream producers, other policy priorities, 
and the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment would 
more likely impede benefits for domestic steel producers at the expense of 
American consumers. 
Additionally, tariff policy is not just international policy since tariffs 
have significant domestic economic effects and can result in strong reactions 
domestically. For example, in 1828, Congress passed a high tariff that 
infuriated southern states, as southerners thought the tariff hurt the cotton 
industry,196 increased the costs of finished goods, and benefitted the northern 
states at the expense of the southern states.197 The “Tariff of Abominations,” 
as it was known in the South, led to the nullification crisis where South 
Carolina asserted a state could nullify federal law within its borders if it 
believed the federal government’s exercise of such powers was 
unconstitutional.198 Fortunately, Congress was able to pass a compromise bill 
 
 192. Meyer, supra note 170, at 628. 
 193. Id. at 630–32. An emergency/non-emergency or crisis/non-crisis distinction that applies equally 
to domestic and international economic action makes more sense. Id. at 630. 
 194. Id. at 633. 
 195. See de Rugy, supra note 189 (discussing steel executives’ “iron grip on the White House”—
Secretary of Commerce Ross sat on a steel company’s board and made his wealth buying and selling steel 
companies, USTR Secretary Robert Lighthizer was the practice group head for Skadden’s International 
Trade group, and one of their big clients was U.S. Steel Corp., and the President’s trade adviser, Peter 
Navarro, is a mercantilist whose documentary against trade with China was largely funded by Nucor 
Corporation, one of the largest domestic steel producers); Boehm, supra note 189; Lincicome, supra note 
189, at 9 (“Protectionist policies emanating from the United States government today are most likely a 
response . . . to discrete interest group lobbying (e.g., the U.S. steel industry) or influential segments of 
the U.S. voting population (e.g., steelworkers in Pennsylvania).”). 
 196. CHAUNCEY S. BOUCHER, THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 116 (1916). 
 197. Id. at 6. 
 198. South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification (Nov. 24, 1832), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
19th_century/ordnull.asp; RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ 
RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS (179–80) (1987); BOUCHER, supra note 196, at 179. 
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that led to South Carolina backing down.199 The nullification crisis 
demonstrates just how important tariff policy is—it can spur a constitutional 
crisis. And in this case, South Carolina and other southerners were infuriated 
by a tariff set by Congress, where there is greater deliberation and inclusion 
of all constituencies. Tariffs that favor certain industries over others set by 
the executive risk evoking even stronger reactions, since losing deliberation 
and inclusion would heighten feelings of inequity. 
Major economic policy decisions should be made by Congress. 
President Trump has shown himself capable of making major economic 
policy decisions on his own by the declaration of “trade wars.” Because the 
President can back up his “trade war” policies with unilateral or near 
unilateral acts,200 his declarations have significant consequences on the 
national economy without the need for further congressional involvement.201 
The more deliberative process of Congress, or even a more restrained process 
in an agency, would prove beneficial over the quickly-implementable 
decisions of the President.202 
The main benefits to congressional action are responsiveness and 
deliberation. Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Kagan 
argued that discretionary delegations made to the President directly should, 
“assuming all else is equal, [present] less, rather than more, severe 
difficulties” than those made to agency officials; the President is more 
democratically responsive and the benefits of legislative reflectiveness are 
lost once a delegation occurs.203 Justice Kagan’s democratic responsiveness 
argument underestimates the democratic control over agency heads and by 
extension agencies. Agency heads: 
who work for the President want to act consistently with his goals, 
priorities, and views. If he favors a certain course of action, his 
 
 199. Donald J. Ratcliffe, The Nullification Crisis, Southern Discontents, and the American Political 
Process, 1 AMER. NINETEENTH CENT. HIST. 1, 13 (2000). 
 200. For example, threatening the use of IEEPA and Section 232. 
 201. Meyer, supra note 170, at 644–47. See also Jim Tankersley, Illuminating the Risks of Trump’s 
China Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/trump-
china-trade-war.html (explaining the effects of Trump’s trade war on U.S. businesses); Isabel Reynolds, 
As China Trade War Cools, Japan Braces for Its Clash with Trump, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-11/as-china-trade-war-cools-japan-braces-for-its-
clash-with-trump (providing an example of just how much and how quickly Trump has been able to 
change economic policy objectives through trade powers). 
 202. Antidumping and countervailing duties (a form of trade remedies) require a more deliberative 
process that involves investigations at the ITC, an independent agency, and the Department of Commerce 
and are subject to judicial review. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32371, TRADE 
REMEDIES: A PRIMER 5–21 (2012). By comparison, the President through Section 232 has been able to 
largely bypass these formalities as the only prerequisite is an affirmative finding by the Secretary of 
Commerce, and Secretary Ross was involved in the domestic steel industry. See supra note 200. 
 203. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2367–68 (2001). 
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subordinates are likely to agree to do as he wishes, and they do so 
voluntarily and generally without hesitation; and if there is any hesitation, 
it will probably be brief.204 
Hesitation will be brief because those who do not wish to act according 
to the President’s policies will either resign, be asked to resign, or be 
removed. Turnover can ensure accountability to the President and by 
extension the American people who voted him to power. The Trump 
Administration has seen a lot of turnover, suggesting that the President has 
not hesitated in ensuring his agency heads are either on board or gone.205 In 
addition to democratic accountability, the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)206 and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
review207 require agencies undergo extensive deliberation through public 
comment, interagency review, White House review, and judicial review. 
While not the exact character of legislative deliberation, these requirements 
are more stringent than those that are placed on presidential action, at least 
as required by Section 232. If Congress were to repeal the APA and its 
procedural requirements, then Justice Kagan would be correct that 
delegations to the President would be, in theory, no more problematic, if not 
less problematic, than delegations to the agencies. 
Further, the negotiation of trade agreements now include many subjects 
outside of the trade in goods, including services, which “threaten 
longstanding and core state police powers.”208 Because of this federalism 
issue, state political representation in Congress, namely through the Senate, 
is an important mechanism for ensuring all states’ concerns are taken into 
account in trade policy. The President does answer to state interests to an 
extent,209 but the representation might favor swing states as opposed to the 
interests of all states, since these are the constituencies seen as the deciders 
of elections.210 Congress on the other hand not only has local connection to 
 
 204. Cass Sunstein, Commentary – The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1874 n.126 (2013). 
 205. Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Report: Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration, BROOKINGS 
INSTIT. (Feb. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-
administration/. 
 206. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 55 (2006). The APA requires agencies to go through 
public comment, places an arbitrary and capricious limitation, and provides for judicial review of final 
agency rulemaking. Id. 
 207. OIRA is an institution within the Office of Management and Budget, that serves as an 
information aggregator and allows for greater White House oversight. Sunstein, supra note 204, at 1875. 
“Significant” regulatory actions, which are those with high impact on the economy or those that raise 
novel issues of law or policy, are submitted to OIRA for approval. Id. at 1850–51. 
 208. Meyer, supra note 170, at 642. 
 209. Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 557 (1954). 
 210. Brookings Creative Lab, Elections 101: Why Are Swing States Important, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 
2016), https://www.youtube/watch?v=IhiY8ZaKDh0; William A. Galston, The States that Will Decide 
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the states, but the Senate was created to represent the interests of all states 
equally.211 Therefore, Congress is better suited to represent all state interests 
than the President. 
With these concerns over legislative character, deliberation, process, 
and federalism, there are both formalist and functionalist reasons for limiting 
Congressional delegations of power to the Executive. A formalist view 
would be that the text of the Constitution supports Congress as the ultimate 
locus of economic regulation and of control over foreign commerce and 
duties.212 Because the power lies with Congress, the regulation of such 
activity should be regarded as legislative. Congress delegating too much 
discretion and major policy making over trade law to the executive would 
impermissibly delegate a legislative power. A functionalist view would not 
allow Congress to delegate power to an extent that would upset the balance 
of power between Congress and the Executive. Each delegation would need 
to be assessed individually to ensure that the President is not able to 
unilaterally dictate economic policy, aggrandize his own power against 
Congress, or exclude state representation in the trade policies that affect 
them. 
D. Section 232 and Separation of Powers 
Even with a separation of powers approach to nondelegation, Section 
232 does not clearly violate separation of powers. Under the Gundy dissent’s 
formalist approach, statutes which merely require executive fact-finding 
before taking effect are permissible. Section 232 requires that Commerce 
determine whether an “article is being imported into the United States in 
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 
national security.”213 The President must concur with Commerce and then 
“determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the 
President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives 
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.”214 
Congress also listed factors to be considered in 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) when 
assessing impairment to the national security, which arguably supports the 
contention that Congress made the policy decision of what was to be 
considered as “threatening to impair the national security.” Much of this part 
 
the 2020 Election Oppose Impeaching Trump, BROOKINGS INSTIT. (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/11/01/the-states-that-will-decide-the-2020-election-
oppose-impeaching-president-trump/. 
 211. Wechsler, supra note 209, at 547–48. 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 213. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). 
 214. Id. 
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of Section 232 seems to be executive fact-finding that “activates” the statute, 
which would be permissible under the second category of the Gundy dissent. 
Congress does not provide much guidance on what actions are 
appropriate to take after a determination that certain imports threaten the 
national security. Unlike other tariff delegations upheld by the Court,215 this 
statute does not specify how the private action (imports) is to be regulated.216 
This portion of the statute may run afoul of the “legislative” power as 
described in the Gundy dissent. The only limitation on the President is that 
(1) the action, in the opinion of the President, adjusts imports “so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the national security”217 and (2) that the 
President must implement such action within fifteen days of making a 
determination that imports of an article did threaten to impair the national 
security.218 These limits do not leave the Executive to just “fill in the details.” 
Not only does the President decide when some general triggering event 
occurs (that imports are threatening to impair the national security),219 but he 
also creates the entire scheme of regulation of private conduct in response to 
the event. He decides the nature, against whom and how much, and the 
duration of the remedial action. The combination of the general factual 
determination and the broad remedy decision allows the President to act in a 
legislative way. 
A complication under the Gundy dissent is whether Section 232 falls 
within the third category of “shared” powers between the President and 
Congress. Section 232 is not solely aimed at domestic economic or trade 
policy. While the possible mechanisms for relief are trade policy, the 
underlying concern is “national security.” There are textual commitments 
regarding national security for both Congress and the Executive.220 Under 
 
 215. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892) (only allowing suspension 
of a free trade provision, not the authority to impose any action deemed necessary). 
 216. The analysis and review of the legislative history of Section 232 in Algonquin suggests broad 
discretion in the “remedy” chosen. The Court does pull back its broad remedy analysis at the end of the 
opinion by assuring that the decision “in no way compels the further conclusion that any action the 
President might take, as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.” FEA v. 
Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 571 (1976). 
 217. In Algonquin, the Court reads the statute to limit the President’s remedial action to only the 
extent “he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports 
will not threaten to impair the national security.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559. This is not the language in 
the current version of the statute. The President shall “determine the nature and duration of the action 
that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives 
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.” 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). 
 218. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). 
 219. The courts could interpret such language more narrowly to avoid a potential delegation problem 
by, for example, reading in an imminence requirement and giving teeth to “necessary.” See discussion in 
supra Section IV. 
 220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16 (congressional power to declare war; raise and support armies; 
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Justice Gorsuch’s third category, where Congress shares powers with 
another branch, Congress may be able to delegate more discretion to another 
branch without running afoul of separation of powers. This is not a 
Commander-in-Chief power, but it does concern national security where 
Congress has delegated much authority to the Executive.221 The pattern of 
delegation may lend credence to the idea that national security falls under a 
shared constitutional power or that there is an established norm of executive 
power being appropriate for national security issues. 
Under a functional separation of powers analysis, it is also unclear 
whether Section 232 runs afoul of the Constitution. Section 232 does give a 
vast amount of power to the Executive, but there are some procedural 
protections built into the statute. Commerce must consult with the Secretary 
of Defense, seek information and advice from appropriate officers of the 
United States, and, if appropriate, hold a public hearing or otherwise afford 
interest parties an opportunity to present information and advice.222 For the 
President to act, Commerce must make an affirmative finding. Congress 
provides specific factors for Commerce and for the President to consider in 
their determinations of whether imports may threaten to impair the national 
security.223 Lastly, the President must report his reasons to Congress.224 
However, Commerce is not required to hold a public hearing225 or to 
meaningfully respond to comments made by the public like an agency would 
if it was subject to notice and comment requirements. There is no provision 
for judicial review.226 While the President cannot act without a positive 
 
to provide and maintain a navy; to regulate land and naval forces; to call forth a militia to suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions; and to organize, arm, and discipline the militia); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 
(President’s Commander in Chief Powers). 
 221. See A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers (“The Brennan Center, building on previous 
research, has identified 123 statutory powers that may become available to the president when he declares 
a national emergency . . . [a]n additional 13 statutory powers become available when a national 
emergency is declared by Congress.”); see also Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 
STAN. L. REV. __ at 1 (forthcoming 2020) (draft on file with author) (“[W]hile Congress kept tight 
controls on the president’s free trade negotiations, it abandoned controls on the exceptional security-
driven authorities, empowering the executive to handle U.S. trade interests in an unbridled way that our 
nation’s founders feared.”). 
 222. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2). 
 223. Id. § 1862(d). 
 224. Id. § 1862(c)(2). 
 225. The Section 232 investigation of petroleum at issue in the Algonquin case proceeded without 
any public hearing or call or submissions from interested parties. FEA. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 
548, 554 (1976). 
 226. Judicial review may not be of much use here. Courts will often defer to the executive in their 
factual findings, especially where the underlying statute delegating authority exudes deference to the 
President and the findings are in the national security arena, an area where the executive has competence 
over the court. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–09 (2018). 
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finding by Commerce, Commerce is appointed by the President, as part of 
his Cabinet, and is subject to removal by the President. Therefore, if the 
President wants to act under Section 232, there is a lot of pressure on 
Commerce to find that imports threaten to impair the national security. The 
only way to undo an “unfavorable” action under Section 232 would be for 
Congress to override the President’s action with new legislation, which is 
not an easy feat and is subject to the President’s veto. This overall lack of 
procedural protection threatens liberty interests and widespread, inclusive 
deliberation, which should cut against the permissibility of the delegation 
under a functional analysis. 
There are legitimate structural reasons to delegate trade authority to the 
Executive in the national security sphere. For one, the Executive can act 
quicker and more discretely than Congress,227 which is useful in the arena of 
national security and national defense. Secondly, the Executive has more 
knowledge about issues of national security. There may be certain facts that 
are not publicly-available that indicate a security threat. The release of such 
information, or the specifics of that information, may cause a security threat. 
But the broad range of non-security factors the President can consider cuts 
against the structural argument allowing for the delegation. For example, 
Congress directs the President and the Secretary to consider the general 
health of an industry or the weakening of our internal economy, not just the 
ability to meet national security requirements.228 This broad analysis about 
the economy and the impacts of imports is the type of analysis Congress is 
best suited for, where nearly all voices of the economy are represented. 
A nondelegation challenge to Section 232 would certainly fail under the 
Court’s current intelligible principle test. Even if the Supreme Court did 
change its approach to nondelegation, a nondelegation challenge to Section 
232 would not be a sure win since this delegation is partially based on 
executive findings of fact and national security. 
IV. EXCEEDING STATUTORY AUTHORITY? 
Another potential issue with the steel order is whether the President has 
exceeded the statutory authority conveyed to him by Section 232 in issuing 
the steel order. The statute provides Commerce shall investigate “to 
 
 227. The timing requirements in Section 232 prompt action and do not require a wait time. 
 228. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (“In the administration of this section, the Secretary and the President shall 
further recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and 
shall take into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual 
domestic industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of 
skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by 
excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such 
weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.”). 
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determine the effects on the national security of imports of the article.”229 
The Secretary must then report the results and advise the President if such 
an “article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under 
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”230 “[I]f the 
President concurs [with the Secretary], [he shall] determine the nature and 
duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be 
taken . . . so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
security.”231 If the courts can exercise judicial review here, there are still 
further issues of what can be reviewed and what is the appropriate standard 
of review. 
A. Attempted Challenges to Statutory Authority 
In April 2018, the CIT denied a motion for a preliminary injunction by 
Severstal Export challenging the President’s steel order issued under Section 
232.232 The Plaintiff tried to frame the challenge as one where the President 
misapprehended his statutory authority, but the arguments made largely 
questioned the true motives of the President in using Section 232. The 
Plaintiff argued the steel order was a negotiating tool, not an action the 
President thought was necessary to protect potential impairment to national 
security.233 
This assertion of intent relied on unofficial statements regarding Section 
232 steel tariffs to support the Plaintiff’s claim.234 In Trump v. Hawaii, the 
Court dismissed the persuasiveness of unofficial statements purporting 
impermissible rationales in undermining the official and permissible 
rationales the government provided in its official order.235 Because the 
government only needed to satisfy rational basis review, the same level of 
review required in this case, the Court was unwilling to strike down a 
measure that was “facially neutral.”236 Although Trump v. Hawaii was in the 
immigration context, where there are specific deferential doctrines at play, 
 
 229. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A). 
 230. Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 
 231. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 232. Severstal Export GMBH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2018). 
 233. Id. at *9. 
 234. Id. at *10. 
 235. Plaintiffs cited tweets and statements made on the campaign trail, Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 
___, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018). The Court said it “may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence but will 
uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of 
unconstitutional grounds.” Id. at 2420. The Proclamation at issue in the case was “expressly premised on 
legitimate purposes.” Id. at 2421. 
 236. Id. at 2423. 
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the Court also stressed the national security aspect of the case for not looking 
at motivations behind a seemingly bona fide measure.237 The Severstal case 
was voluntarily dismissed, with prejudice, after preliminary injunctive relief 
was denied.238 
In another case at the CIT, importers are challenging the President’s 
decision to double the Section 232 tariffs on Turkey. Plaintiffs accuse the 
President of exceeding statutory authority as well as violating the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection.239 
Additionally, there is a potential procedural issue, since the specific increase 
in tariffs on Turkey was taken more than fifteen days after the President 
concurred with Commerce’s report to the President, as required by the 
statute.240 It is unclear whether this deadline applies only to the initial action 
or to all actions taken under Section 232. This procedural argument could 
also be applied to the President’s recent extension of the tariffs to derivative 
steel parts.241 The CIT denied the government’s motion to dismiss, stating 
that 
[b]ased on the facts alleged, Plaintiff’s argument that the President failed 
to follow the procedure set forth in the statute and, further, that singling 
out importers from Turkey violated the equal protection guarantees under 
the U.S. Constitution, support its claim for a refund. . . .242 
The case is still pending. 
B. Availability and Scope of Review 
Neither the TEA nor the APA provide judicial review for actions taken 
under Section 232. The APA does not apply because the President is not 
subject to the APA and he issued the steel order.243 Secondly, Commerce’s 
report and recommendation are not reviewable under the APA because 
neither are “final” agency actions.244 To be a final action, there must be a 
direct legal effect, not just a “tentative” effect.245 
 
 237. Id. at 2419 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 480 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1972)). 
 238. Order Granting Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, Severstal Export GMBH v. United States, No. 
18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018). 
 239. Amended Complaint at 2–3, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade Apr. 2, 2019). 
 240. 19 U.S.C.  1862(c)(1)(B) (2018). 
 241. Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles into the 
United States, Proclamation No. 9980, 85 Fed. Reg. 5,281 (Jan. 29, 2020). 
 242. Opinion and Order at 2, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
Nov. 15, 2019). 
 243. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992). 
 244. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
 245. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796–97. In Franklin, the Secretary issued a report regarding the census 
for purposes of Congressional apportionment. Nothing in the report took effect without presidential 
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The lack of a statutory basis for review does not prohibit all judicial 
review. “[I]t is a widely shared premise that, absent a congressional ouster 
of judicial review, judicial review is available to assess whether federal 
officials acted within the scope of their statutory powers,” since acting 
beyond statutory authority would be unconstitutional.246 If the President 
acted outside of the scope of his conferred authority in an area where he has 
no independent powers, he acted unconstitutionally.247 If the act is 
unconstitutional, the courts can enjoin government officials in enforcing the 
unconstitutional action.248 
It is possible that the courts cannot review the steel order due to judicial 
review being unavailable. Where a statute commits a decision to the 
discretion of the President, the availability of review of that discretion is 
questionable.249 Specter v. Dalton dealt with this issue of challenging the 
discretion of a statutorily-delegated decision. Congress passed the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act, which required that the Secretary of 
Defense make recommendations about base closures and gave the President 
the ability to approve or disapprove the Commission’s recommendations.250 
In reviewing the validity of the President’s approval, the court determined 
that: 
[W]here a claim ‘concerns not a want of [presidential] power, but a mere 
excess or abuse of discretion in exerting a power given, it is clear that it 
involves considerations which are beyond the reach of judicial power. This 
must be since, as this court has often pointed out, the judicial may not 
invade the legislative or executive departments so as to correct alleged 
mistakes or wrongs arising from asserted abuse of discretion.’251 
 
action. The Steel Report’s “effect” is very similar to the Secretary’s report at issue in Franklin. 
 246. Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 
1176 (2009). 
 247. See Larry Alexander & Evan Tsen Lee, Is There Such A Thing As Extraconstitutionality?: The 
Puzzling Case of Dalton v. Specter, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845, 854 (1995) (“Every act that exceeds 
[legislatively delegated, non-independent] statutory authority is necessarily unconstitutional . . . because 
it violates the limited powers principle.”); id. at 859 (“[T]he Specter Court supported its distinction 
between acts ‘beyond all statutory authority’ and acts ‘merely in excess of statutory authority’ by citing 
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. . . . The problem is that the distinction [by dicta] made 
no more sense in Larson than it does in Specter.”). 
 248. See ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 828–29 (“Review of the legality 
of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to 
enforce the President’s directive.”). 
 249. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994) (“So the claim raised here is a statutory one: The 
President is said to have violated the terms of the 1990 Act by accepting procedurally flawed 
recommendations. The exception identified in Franklin for review of constitutional claims thus does not 
apply in this case . . . But longstanding authority holds that such review is not available when the statute 
in question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.”). 
 250. Id. at 465. 
 251. Id. at 474 (quoting Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 184 
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Because the “statute vested complete discretion in the President,” 
Congress must have “intended that the President’s approval or disapproval 
be free from judicial review” and the Court must respect Congress’s 
wishes.252 The Court was probably correct that judicial review in this 
instance was inappropriate because Congress “chose not to constrain the 
President’s authority with any statutory criteria.”253 By delegating 
unconstrained power, there would be no standard to which a court could 
evaluate the President’s compliance with the statute. 
A much broader proposition than contemplated by the facts in Dalton 
is that “judicial review is not available as to whether the President’s exercise 
of authority exceeded the bounds granted.”254 Recently in Trump v. Hawaii, 
the government challenged the ability of the Court to address the merits of 
Plaintiff’s “statutory” claims.255 The Government relied on the doctrine of 
consular nonreviewability, not Dalton, in challenging review.256 Like 
Section 232, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also grants the 
President broad discretion.257 In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court admitted the 
justiciability issue presented “a difficult question,” but because  the INA did 
not “expressly strip[] the Court of jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims,” the 
Court chose to “assume without deciding that the plaintiffs’ statutory claims 
were reviewable, notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or any other 
statutory nonreviewability issue.”258 While the Court did not decide the 
issue, its opinion suggests that the Court would be willing to review statutory 
claims given there is no express, or perhaps implied, bar by Congress. This 
would square with Dalton if the unbounded discretion is read as an “express” 
or “clear” bar to review. 
The discretion given to the President under Section 232 is not 
completely unbounded, though it is quite broad. In Algonquin, the plaintiffs 
challenged the imposition of license fees on oil imports as impermissible 
under the statute.259 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs as to the tools 
 
(1919)). 
 252. Alexander & Tsen Lee, supra note 247, at 849. 
 253. Stack, supra note 246, at 1195. 
 254. Id. at 1197. 
 255. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018). The Court referred to the claims that the 
President violated the statute as “statutory” claims, not “constitutional” claims. 
 256. Id. (arguing that “exclusion of aliens is a ‘fundamental act of sovereignty’ by the political 
branches,” “not within the province of any court,” and that this idea is confirmed by Congress 
“authoriz[ing] judicial review only for aliens physically present in the United States”). 
 257. Id. at 2408. 
 258. Id. at 2407. 
 259. FEA. v. Algonquin, 426 U.S. 548, 556 (1976). 
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available,260 but determined the President’s remedy was limited “to the 
extent ‘he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its 
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
security.’”261 The Supreme Court identified limits on the discretion given to 
the President: (1) that the remedy probably can only impact imports directly 
(not remotely)262 and (2) the remedy should be to ensure imports will not 
threaten to impair the national security.263 Congress also provided specific 
time limits in the implementation of Section 232, which suggests Congress 
intended for some limits. In Algonquin, the Court did not question the 
availability of judicial review for the claim that the President exceeded his 
statutory authority. 
There are some cases supporting the idea that determination of facts and 
the motives underlying decisions committed to discretion are not reviewable. 
In older cases, the Court held that: 
[W]here Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified 
legislative action when in his judgment that action is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer 
as to the existence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to 
review. . . For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this 
Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and 
executive domains.264 
Dalton cites George S. Bush & Co. as support for review being 
unavailable in that case.265 But as discussed, there were no standards to assess 
the President’s decision-making in Dalton. The Federal Circuit, the circuit 
court that typically hears international trade disputes after appeal from the 
CIT, has likewise cited in many cases that “[t]he President’s findings of fact 
and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”266 
 
 260. See id. at 561 (noting that § 232(b)’s language “seems clearly to grant [the President] a measure 
of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports”). The District Court of D.C. did 
think there was a limit to remedial powers being on imports themselves, not domestic products. Indep. 
Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 1980). This conclusion 
comports with the Supreme Court’s language at the end of the Algonquin decision that made clear that 
the Court’s decision “in no way compels the further conclusion that any action the President might take, 
as long as it has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.” Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 571. 
 261. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. at 571. 
 263. Id. at 559. See also Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 
15, 2019) (stating that the statute “cabins the President’s power [substantively] by requiring the action to 
eliminate threats to national security caused by imports”). 
 264. U.S. v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940). 
 265. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994). 
 266. Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Corus Group PLC v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 
F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Florsheim Shoe Co., Div. of Interco, Inc., v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 
795 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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Academics argue that “judicial review should extend to all issues 
necessary to determine whether the President has acted within the scope of 
his statutory powers, regardless of whether those issues are classified as 
issues of law, fact, or law-to-fact application” as a branch of ultra vires 
review.267 The Court should be able to review issues that are not committed 
to the unbounded discretion of the President. “[I]n the judgment of the 
President” does confer discretion, but he is still limited to taking action that 
“adjust[s] the imports” and that will ensure the imports “will not threaten to 
impair the national security,” suggesting bounds to his discretion. The issue 
here is that availability of review and the merits begin to blend because both 
ask questions about the discretion given to the President. 
Success on the merits depends on whether there is a limit on the 
decisions of the President under Section 232 and whether he acted outside of 
those limits. Availability of review under Dalton turns on whether the 
decision is fully discretionary and meant to be shielded from judicial review 
or is subject to certain standards and open to judicial review. Therefore, a 
court would need to interpret the statute before being able to determine 
whether Dalton prohibits review. 
C. Standard of Review 
There is no consensus on the standard of review courts should apply 
when reviewing Presidential actions. Courts have applied different standards 
of review in different substantive areas.268 Deference usually depends on 
whether the question relates to presidential fact-finding, motivations, or legal 
interpretations. 
As to fact-finding, the level of deference given by the court could 
depend on the competency of the courts,269 the statutory language,270 and the 
level of mixed fact and policy in making a determination. The courts have 
been particularly deferential in areas such as immigration, national security, 
and foreign affairs, where the President is seen to have particular expertise 
compared to the judiciary. Additionally, facts that are hard to separate out 
 
 267. Stack, supra note 246, at 1177 (emphasis added). 
 268. The court has generally been more deferential in areas such as foreign affairs, immigration, and 
national security. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 513 (2008) (giving Executive Branch interpretation of a treaty “great weight”); Robert M. Chesney, 
Disaggregating Deference: Hamdan, the Judicial Power, and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 1723 (2007). 
 269. The Second Circuit has said that “we see no reason why Executive fact-finding must be totally 
insulated from judicial review,” but instead wanted the inquiry to focus on whether the area of fact-finding 
was one where the courts are incompetent. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 270. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409. 
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from policy judgments would likely receive greater deference.271 For 
example, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court determined that the underlying 
statute (INA) did not clearly require the President to “explain [his] finding 
with sufficient detail to enable judicial review,” showing the statute itself 
indicates the appropriate review of the facts by the courts.272 Additionally, 
the Court recognized “plaintiffs’ request for a searching inquiry into the 
persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with . . . the 
deference traditionally accorded the President in this sphere.”273 The Court 
went on to further recognize that in the national security context, the 
President is “not required to conclusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle 
before [courts] grant weight to [his] empirical conclusions.”274 
Even in these spheres of greater deference, the Court has reduced the 
level of deference based on competing values and concerns. For example, in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where there was a habeas challenge to a U.S. citizen’s 
detention, the Court posited that when individual liberty is at stake, “[a]ny 
process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged 
or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged . . . 
to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”275 The stakes in this 
case are much lower than in Hamdi, so the courts would likely take less issue 
in deferring to the executive on factual determinations. At minimum, the 
President arguably has an obligation to be honest and engage in a reasonable 
inquiry in finding facts.276 This requirement is supported by the Court’s 
emphasis on the twelve-page report and the multi-agency review process in 
Trump v. Hawaii.277 However, an obligation of honesty and reasonability 
may be hard to police. 
As for motivation, the Supreme Court recently declined to “look 
behind” the President’s exercise of discretion in his admission of aliens 
authority when there was a facially legitimate reason for his decision.278 The 
Court did not explicitly extend this principle to all areas of the law, but the 
 
 271. Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 900 (2019). 
 272. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 (comparing to Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) 
where a statute that authorized the CIA Director to terminate an employee when the director deemed the 
“termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States” and the Court thought this 
foreclosed “any meaningful judicial standard of review”). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010)). 
 275. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality). 
 276. See Roisman, supra note 271, at 852 (grounding this argument in “conventional sources of 
constitutional interpretation, including the text of the Constitution, its structural features, Supreme Court 
precedent, and past branch practice”). 
 277. 138 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 278. Id. at 2419. 
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motivating fear that statements regarding either illegal or extra-legal reasons 
for action might undermine the President’s ability to act on a certain issue 
indefinitely exists no matter the area of law. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the President is 
unlikely to receive deference in his interpretation of statutes. For example, 
in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court looked to the plain meaning of the text to 
determine the President’s statutory authority, not the government’s 
interpretation of the statute.279 Likewise, in Algonquin, the Court did its own 
statutory analysis of the range of actions contemplated by the statute, even 
with Section 232’s discretionary language.280 The Court has given “great 
weight deference” to the President in interpreting treaties, but that is due to 
the Executive’s special knowledge of such agreements and the potential 
international ramifications of treaty interpretation.281 Some academics have 
suggested applying Chevron deference to the President in his interpretations 
of law in the foreign affairs and national security spheres.282 An issue with 
expanding the level of deference given to the President is that, unlike 
agencies, there are no APA protections. Because he already receives 
deference regarding factual determinations and rationales in this sphere, 
extending deference to the President’s interpretation of the law would place 
too much power in the hands of the President. 
The Federal Circuit has followed a very deferential position towards the 
President in trade controversies, seemingly regarding matters of law. 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit has held that “[f]or a court to interpose, there 
has to be a clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a significant 
procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority.”283 While this is 
not necessarily deference to the Executive’s reading of the statute, the 
Federal Circuit seems to be willing to read the statutory authority as broadly 
as possible to encompass the President’s actions. No other circuits seem to 
have the “clear misconstruction” standard. 
Based on the cases and rationales surrounding deference, it is unlikely 
 
 279. Id. at 2410 (“In short, the language of § 1182(f) is clear, and the Proclamation does not exceed 
any textual limit on the President’s authority.”). 
 280. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 561–71 (1976). 
 281. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (giving executive branch interpretation of a treaty 
“great weight”); Chesney, supra note 273, at 1273. 
 282. Oren Eisner, Note, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential Interpretations of Ambiguities 
in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes Delegating Lawmaking Power to the President, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 411–12 (2001) (explaining Chevron deference is a deference given to agencies by 
the courts regarding an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutes). 
 283. Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). See 
also Corus Group PLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Silfab Solar, Inc. 
v. United States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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that a challenge to the facts found by the Department of Commerce and relied 
on by the President or the background motives unrelated to national security 
will be strong enough to overcome the courts’ deferential review.284 What 
would be within the scope of review is the meaning of the statutory language 
and what standards the President had to follow. The line between questions 
of law, fact, and policy is not always clear, but the role of the courts is 
strongest where there is a question of law. 
D. Definition of “Threaten to Impair the National Security” 
The only Supreme Court case interpreting the language in Section 232 
is Algonquin.285 In Algonquin, the plaintiffs challenged President Ford’s 
imposition of license fees on oil imports as impermissible under the 
statute.286 Specifically, plaintiffs thought that “adjust” in the statute meant 
only direct, quantitative restrictions on imports, i.e. quotas. The Court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs and thought that the remedial power of the 
President under the statute could include license fees and tariffs to adjust 
imports.287 However, the Court noted that the President’s remedy decision 
was limited because the President could “act only to the extent ‘he deems 
necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the national security.’”288 Based on its 
analysis of the legislative history, the Court determined that “national 
security” is narrower than the “national interest,” as the term “national 
interest” was passed by the Senate but deleted by the Conference Committee 
when passing the TEA of 1962.289 The Court did not have occasion to further 
define “threaten to impair the national security” and mainly limited its 
 
 284. Even where judicial review is deferential, there are several benefits to its availability. Stack, 
supra note 246, at 1208 (“Judicial review provides occasion for aggrieved parties to monitor the 
President’s action and as a result forces disclosure of the basis for the President’s actions to Congress and 
other political constituencies. Further, the prospect of review, even if deferential, provides incentives for 
the President (and his lawyers) to provide a reasoned explanation for the conclusions he reaches. The 
need to produce some explanation to which the courts may defer has a transparency-enforcing effect. It 
also avoids the signal that the President is beyond the reach of the courts. And because this would merely 
be a default presumption of reviewability, it could be ousted by Congress under particular statutes.”). 
 285. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 548. 
 286. Id. at 556. 
 287. See id. at 561 (noting that § 232(b)’s language “seems clearly to grant [the President] a measure 
of discretion in determining the method to be used to adjust imports”). The District Court of D.C. did 
think there was a limit that remedial powers be against imports, not domestic products. Indep. Gasoline 
Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 1980). This conclusion comports with 
the Supreme Court’s language at the end of the Algonquin decision that made clear that the Court’s 
decision “in no way compels the further conclusion that any action the President might take, as long as it 
has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.” Algonquin, 462 U.S. at 571. 
 288. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 559. 
 289. Id. at 568–69. 
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analysis to remedies available under Section 232. 
Section 232 limits the extent of the President’s action to actions he 
deems necessary to adjust imports “so that such imports will not threaten to 
impair the national security.”290 Determining this standard’s meaning is 
critical to understanding the scope of authority conferred. The statute 
arguably does not give the President full discretion in determining the 
meaning of this standard. Section 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) provides that: 
“if the President concurs [with Commerce’s recommendation], [he shall] 
determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the 
President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its 
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
security.”291 
While “in the judgment” commits discretion to the President, this 
phrase does not modify the entire provision. “[I]n the judgment of the 
President” at the beginning or end of the sentence would modify the entire 
provision, making the meaning of “threaten to impair the national security” 
unreviewable. Placing the discretionary commitment in the middle of the 
clause suggests Congress only meant to commit the determination of the 
nature and duration of the act that needed to be taken to the President. This 
interpretation fits the Algonquin Court’s review of what “adjusts the 
imports” means and its determination that “threaten to impair the national 
security” is a standard more limited than the “national interest.”292 
National security is not defined in the statute. Congress often delegates 
authority to the President based on “national security,” but rarely defines the 
term.293 Courts also rarely try to posit the meaning of national security.294 In 
one case, the Court defined “national security” in a law that allowed for the 
government to fire employees in certain agencies if it was “in the interest of 
the national security of the United States.”295 In that case, the Court defined 
the term fairly narrowly to “comprehend only those activities of the 
Government that are directly concerned with the protection of the Nation 
from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those which 
contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the 
general welfare.”296 Where national security is defined in statutes, the term 
has been defined fairly broadly.297 Section 232 does provide a list of factors 
 
 290. Id. at 559. 
 291. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 292. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 569. 
 293. Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA L. REV. 1183, 1197–98 (2018). 
 294. Id. at 1198. 
 295. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 538 (1956). 
 296. Id. at 544. 
 297. Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1580 (2011). 
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relevant to the determination of whether imports are “threatening to impair 
the national security.” These factors include economic ones, which does 
indicate that a reading of “threaten to impair the national security” means 
more than the national defense needs to defend an imminent armed attack.298 
The Department of Commerce in its investigation into iron ore under 
Section 232 in 2001 considered several definitions of “threaten to impair the 
national security.”299 Commerce first tried to ascertain the meaning of 
national security. Commerce concluded that “national defense” must be a 
component, and that the term could refer to domestic national defense needs 
or the ability to project U.S. military capabilities globally, or both.300 
Commerce thought that, in addition to national defense requirements, 
national security could include the “general security and welfare of certain 
industries . . . that are critical to the minimum operations of the economy and 
government.”301 Given the factors listed in § 1862(d), Congress likely 
intended the term to include the welfare of critical industries, at least to an 
extent. The economic considerations listed in the statute were couched in 
terms such as ability to “meet national security requirements” or weakening 
of the “internal economy” (not an industry) that “impair[s] the national 
security.”302 Also, a Section 232 investigation into oil in 1999 limited its 
inquiry into DOD requirements when assessing national security needs.303 
The meaning of “threaten to impair” the national security must also be 
assessed. Commerce in its 2001 iron ore investigation determined imports 
could reasonably be found to threaten the national security when the United 
States must rely on unsafe or unreliable imports304 or is “excessively 
 
 298. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2018) (“[G]ive consideration to domestic production needed for projected 
national defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements . . . the 
requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including the investment, 
exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of 
their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries and the capacity of the 
United States to meet national security requirements . . . the Secretary and the President shall further 
recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and shall take 
into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or 
investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by 
excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such 
weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security.”) 
 299. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN., supra note 58, at 6–7. 
 300. Id. at 5. 
 301. Id. 
 302. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (emphasis added) (suggesting, perhaps, greater importance of a severe 
weakening of the whole economy, not just a sector of the economy). 
 303. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF IMPORTS OF CRUDE 
OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (1999). 
 304. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMIN., supra note 58, at 6. 
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dependent” on imports.305 This interpretation was supported by three 
previous Section 232 investigations.306 Furthermore, Commerce found that 
“imports can threaten the national security if they fundamentally threaten the 
viability of U.S. industries and resources needed to produce domestically 
goods and services necessary to ensure U.S. national security.”307 Key here 
is excessive dependence on imports and fundamental threats to critical 
industry viability. If “threaten to impair the national security” included just 
average reliance on imports and some threat to critical industry, the meaning 
of “national security” would not be much narrower than “national interest.” 
In the 2001 report, Commerce recognized it conducted its analysis under the 
broadest definition,308 “most likely to result in a positive finding.”309 
Further support for a narrower reading of “threaten to impair the 
national security” is the nondelegation canon.310 The nondelegation canon is 
a companion to the idea of constitutional avoidance—“[w]here Congress has 
attempted to do something that may intrude on constitutional values . . . 
courts resist this effort by insisting that Congress make its intent absolutely 
clear.”311 So, while the nondelegation doctrine is often considered dead, the 
doctrine may live on through a limiting canon of construction.312 
Cass Sunstein has identified three areas where the courts have adopted 
the nondelegation canon: constitutional concerns, sovereignty issues, and 
areas of public policy.313 Constitutionally inspired nondelegation canons 
include the application of constitutional avoidance to agency interpretations 
of statutes, even where ambiguous (trumping Chevron), limiting 
interpretation of ambiguous provisions as to preempt state law (even though 
national preemption is not unconstitutional, but serves federalism principles 
in the Constitution), and limiting retroactive application of statutes unless its 
retroactivity was made clear by Congress.314 Sovereignty-inspired 
nondelegation canons, which are “grounded in widespread understandings 
about sovereignty,” include application of a presumption against 
 
 305. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 306. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY (1994); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT 
OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCT IMPORTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY (1988)). 
 307. Id. (emphasis added). 
 308. Id. at 5. 
 309. Id. at 7. 
 310. See generally Sunstein, supra note 113. 
 311. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2000). 
 312. Sunstein, supra note 113, at 315–16. 
 313. Id. at 330. 
 314. Id. at 331–32. 
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extraterritoriality for agency interpretations, unfavorable treatment to Native 
Americans, and waiving sovereign immunity.315 Nondelegation canons 
inspired by public policy include limiting agencies ability to interpret: 
exemptions from taxation, anticompetitive practices, and the ability to make 
very large expenditures for trivial gains.316 For Section 232, because of the 
constitutional concerns regarding this delegation discussed in Part III, a 
narrower interpretation of “threaten to impair the national security” would 
invoke the constitutional concerns underlying the nondelegation canon. 
In the recent steel report, Commerce adopted a definition of “threaten 
to impair the national security” similar to the definition used in the 2001 
Steel Report, but came to a different conclusion due to changed 
circumstances in the steel industry.317 Importantly, Commerce did not agree 
with the 2001 formulation of “fundamental” threat to the viability of the 
domestic industry.318 Commerce did not assess reliance on “excessive” 
imports, but rather determined that imports were excessive and could lead to 
reliance on imports for national security needs in the future.319 
In his proclamation, the President did not give an explicit definition of 
“threaten to impair the national security.” He said that he concurred in the 
Secretary’s finding.320 His reasoning was that the tariff would “ensur[e] 
economic viability of our domestic steel industry.”321 Also with a declining 
steel industry, the United States would need to rely on foreign imports for its 
security needs, which would be unsafe for the nation.322 Like the Commerce 
report, the President did not assess whether steel imports are fundamentally 
threatening the viability of the domestic steel industry or whether the decline 
of the steel industry would lead to excessive reliance on foreign imports. 
Commerce incorrectly interpreting “threaten to impair the national 
security” would not necessarily invalidate the President’s imposition of the 
tariff. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in other contexts, has 
“rejected the contention that the failure of [an agency] to comply with its 
statutory obligations invalidates presidential action.”323 In Dalton, the 
Supreme Court stated that if “nothing in [the relevant statute] requires the 
President to determine whether the [agency] committed any procedural 
 
 315. Id. at 332–33. 
 316. Id. at 334–35. 
 317. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at 13–14 (2018). 
 318. Id. at 14 n.15. 
 319. Id. at 4. 
 320. Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625, 11,626 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 11,627. 
 323. Silfab Solar, Inc. v. U.S., 892 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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violations in making [its] recommendations;” his action is not invalid, 
especially when the statute does not “prohibit the President from approving 
recommendations that are procedurally flawed.”324 Unlike in that case, the 
issue with Commerce’s determination would be substantive, not just 
procedural, which might normatively give more pause in ignoring the 
underlying flaw. This substantive error by Commerce would not necessarily 
make a difference, unless one can argue that the President’s proclamation 
suggests he concurs in not just the determination of the Secretary, but in the 
analysis of the Secretary. Then, the President’s interpretation of the scope of 
“threaten to impair the national security” would be incorrect, meaning his 
action does not fit the standard he is required to follow. 
If the broad definition of threaten to impair the national security is 
accepted, then the current order is likely valid and within the scope of 
authority delegated to the President. But such latitude giving the President 
near unfettered authority in an area where the founders clearly thought the 
procedural hurdles of Congress were needed puts the wrong branch in 
charge.325 A narrower construction of the scope of authority delegated would 
mitigate nondelegation concerns. 
As a practical matter, the President could just state that the threat to the 
steel industry is “fundamental” and our future reliance on imports would be 
“excessive” without much review from the courts, due to the deference given 
to fact-finding in the national security sphere. But stretching the facts to meet 
a more stringent legal standard will pose higher political costs. If the 
President is paying no more than lip service to the statute, this will be more 
apparent under the narrower construction of “threaten to impair the national 
security” than the easy-to-meet, broad construction advanced by Commerce 
in the 2018 Steel Report. A president abusing his discretion and authority 
conferred by Congress would, presumably, carry a higher risk of upsetting 
voters because not only will there be concern over the policy outcomes of 
the decision, but over the abuse of authority via bad faith factual 
determinations. 
V. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
The steel orders’ compliance with international law is important in two 
regards. For one, international law may affect our interpretation of the statute 
under domestic law. Second, we may just generally be concerned over 
whether the President’s order violates international trade law. If it does, this 
could have implications on our relations with other nations, who may have a 
 
 324. Id. at 1347 (citing Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994)). 
 325. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizures), 343 U.S. 579, 867 (1952). 
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right to retaliate, and for the international trade law system as a whole. The 
steel orders likely violate WTO trade rules, but the potential for international 
violations under Section 232 is unlikely to have much effect on the statute’s 
interpretation as a matter of domestic law. 
For states that are a part of the WTO, like the United States, 
international trade law is largely governed by the WTO treaties. The core 
agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 1994. 
The GATT promotes trade liberalization through a strategy of “channel and 
bind.” This strategy promotes nations to “channel” trade restrictions into 
tariffs (since they are more transparent and less market-distorting than other 
market access barriers) and “bind” those tariff rates by making commitments 
to not raise tariffs above a certain level provided for in the GATT tariff 
schedules. 
The WTO agreements allow for some deviations from the bound rate. 
For example, a nation can implement trade remedies (in a manner consistent 
with the WTO agreements), which allow extra duties to be applied to imports 
from companies who dump, from countries that provide subsidies, and as a 
response to an injurious surge of imports.326 The WTO also provides general 
exceptions in Article XX, allowing for deviation from commitments when 
such measures are, for example, in the name of public morals, protecting 
human, animal or plant life, or protecting exhaustible resources.327 
An exception provided for in the GATT that has been less-invoked and 
less-tested until now is Article XXI, which deals with national security 
exceptions.328 In the last few years, the WTO has experienced a surge in 
national security-related cases, including: Ukraine’s complaint against 
Russia over its transit restrictions, South Korea’s complaint against Japan for 
its export restrictions on certain chemicals crucial to Korea’s electronics 
industry; Qatar’s complaints against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United 
Arab Emirates over trade in goods, services, and intellectual property rights; 
India’s notification to the WTO regarding revocation of most-favored nation 
status for Pakistan; and the seven complaints filed against the United States 
over its Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs.329 Article XXI is the 
exception that the United States would need to argue for the recent steel 
 
 326. These are known as anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards. 
 327. GATT, supra note 28, art. XX(a)–(b), (g). Article XX works as an affirmative defense and bears 
the burden of (1) proving its measures properly fall into one of the categories of the exception and (2) 
follow the “chapeau” of Article XX, which requires members apply these measures in a justifiable way. 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Importation Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶¶ 156–60, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998). 
 328. GATT, supra note 28, art. XXI. 
 329. Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security: The Making of the 
GATT Security Exceptions, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109, 111–13 (2020). 
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tariffs to be permissible under the GATT. 
A. Domestic Legal Affect 
International trade law will likely not have an impact on the validity of 
the Section 232 steel tariffs under domestic law or on the interpretation of 
Section 232. As for invalidating the orders themselves, treaties are only 
given direct effect in the United States if they are considered “self-
executing”; otherwise, Congress needs to pass specific legislation 
implementing the treaty.330 Even then, a treaty is on par with federal statutes 
under the United States’ hierarchy of law, meaning a statute passed later in 
time and directly in conflict would likely trump a treaty.331 The Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA) did implement the GATT agreements 
through legislation, but the URAA gave the GATT agreements weak 
status.332 Specifically, Congress said the URAA should not limit any 
authority conferred under any law of the United States, which would include 
the steel orders under Section 232.333 
Courts usually interpret statutes that implicate international law in a 
way that does not violate international law, unless Congress clearly specified 
otherwise in the statute.334 This canon of construction is known as the 
Charming Betsy canon and is based on the assumption that Congress does 
not intend to violate international law. Normally, this canon might counsel a 
narrower reading of Section 232 to guarantee the authority it conferred 
would not exceed those actions permissible under GATT Article XXI. But 
the language of the URAA cuts against an aggressive application of 
Charming Betsy. In Section 102, Congress specified that the URAA could 
not override other inconsistent federal laws, whether passed prior or 
subsequent to the URAA.335 Nor did Congress want the URAA to “limit any 
authority conferred under any law of the United States,” which would 
include Section 232.336 Nor is the language of Section 232 modeled after 
Article XXI of the GATT; rather, the language is much broader, suggesting 
 
 330. Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131 (2008). 
 331. John James Barcelo, The Status of WTO Rules in U.S. Law, in RETHINKING THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM (J. Barcelo & H. Corbet eds., 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=887757. 
 332. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3511–3556, 3571–3572, 3581–3592, 3601–3624). 
 333. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(B) (1994). 
 334. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (citing Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”). 
 335. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1). Usually later statutes prevail over earlier statutes in the case of direct 
conflict. 
 336. Id. § 3512(a)(2)(B). 
SCOTT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:07 PM 
2020] STEEL STANDING: WHAT’S NEXT FOR SECTION 232? 427 
that Congress did not intend to limit Section 232 to situations permissible 
under Article XXI. 
Further, a domestic court’s interpretation of Article XXI might not even 
significantly limit Section 232 because of its own interpretation of 
international law. The WTO panel in Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic 
in Transit, as explained below,337 defined Article XXI narrowly enough to 
seriously question the steel order’s compliance with the GATT (therefore 
indicating a broad reading of authority under Section 232 would lead to 
international law violations). But a domestic court need not agree with the 
WTO panel’s narrow interpretation of Article XXI.338 Even under the 
WTO’s own rules, panel decisions are only binding to the parties and 
measures in front of it.339 Also, the URAA specifies that any regulation or 
practice that is found inconsistent by a panel or appellate body report cannot 
be amended to conform to the decision until the U.S. government has 
implemented the decision,340 suggesting resistance to WTO panel 
determinations even where the United States is a party without approval by 
one of the political branches. While a WTO panel will not receive deference 
as to the meaning of Article XXI, the executive branch will receive “great 
weight deference” by the courts on matters of treaty interpretation.341 The 
Office of the United States Trade Representative has claimed that the Section 
232 steel tariffs “plainly fall within the legitimate scope of Article XXI.”342 
Because of the weak status given to WTO rules in the United States’ 
federal laws and the great weight deference given to the Executive’s 
interpretation of treaties, international trade law will likely not result in any 
domestic legal ramifications on the validity of the steel orders or the scope 
of Section 232. However, under an international law analysis, the current 
steel orders are likely problematic under Article XXI of the GATT. The 
 
 337. See discussion infra Section V.C. 
 338. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006) (“If treaties are to be given 
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department.’”). 
 339. Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings, 
WORLD TRADE ORG. (2004), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/ 
c7s2p1_e.htm (“[R]eports of panels and the Appellate Body are not binding precedents for other disputes 
between the same parties on other matters or different parties on the same matter, even though the same 
questions of WTO law might arise.”). See also Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355–56 (“Any interpretation 
of law the ICJ renders in the course of resolving particular disputes is thus not binding precedent even as 
to the ICJ itself; there is accordingly little reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be 
controlling on our courts.”). 
 340. 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2018). 
 341. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008). 
 342. Press Release, Statement by Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer on Retaliatory Duties (June 26, 
2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/statement-
ambassador-robert-e. 
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following subsections will analyze the availability and scope of review of 
Article XXI claims, the existing panel decision on Article XXI, and the 
justifications for the steel orders under Article XXI. 
B. Availability and Scope of Review of Article XXI under the GATT 
The interpretation of Article XXI is sensitive because determinations 
regarding what is necessary for a nation’s essential security interests is a core 
sovereignty interest. There is much debate between WTO parties as to 
whether Article XXI is reviewable and to what extent it can be reviewed.343 
Additionally, unlike other provisions of the GATT, Article XXI(b) contains 
language that indicates that there is a level of self-judgment when it comes 
to what constitutes an action necessary for the protection of essential security 
interests. The text of Article XXI states: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they 
are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war 
and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on 
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment; [or] 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations.344 
Dispute settlement under the GATT changed significantly with the 
creation of the WTO and the adoption of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).345 Members of the WTO can bring a complaint 
against another member who is allegedly violating its obligations under the 
agreement and harming a right of the complaining member. If no solution is 
reached after consultations, the complaining Member can request the 
establishment of a panel to rule on the alleged violations.346 The complaining 
member and respondent include all claims in a terms of reference, which 
limits the scope of the dispute and the extent of the panel’s jurisdiction under 
 
 343. Doug Palmer, US Sides with Russia in WTO National Security Case Against Ukraine, POLITICO 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/us-sides-with-russia-in-wto-national-security-case-
against-ukraine/. 
 344. GATT, supra note 28, art. XXI (emphasis added). 
 345. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
 346. The Process – Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case: 6.3 The Panel Stage, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s3p1_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
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Article 7.1 of the DSU.347 Nothing in the DSU specifies any special rules or 
limitations regarding Article XXI.348 Panel decisions can be appealed to an 
Appellate Body panel, which contains three Appellate Body Members. 
Appellate Body Members are appointed and approved by the WTO member 
states and serve four-year terms.349 While there is no formal stare decisis in 
WTO dispute settlement, Appellate Body reports are often followed, 
especially if the reasoning is persuasive, as this enhances security, 
predictability, and “rule of law.”350 
Even though the DSU does not indicate an exception for review of 
Article XXI, some nations have argued that the language itself prohibits DSU 
jurisdiction. Russia in particular has argued that panels do not have 
jurisdiction to hear Article XXI claims because the term “which [the party 
invoking Article XXI] considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests” is completely self-judging.351 The United States has a 
similar—though slightly more nuanced—position that while panels 
technically have “jurisdiction” over an Article XXI claim, the claim is 
nonjusticiable, and so the panel cannot make a determination as to whether 
a party has complied with Article XXI.352 
The European Union has argued that panels should have extensive 
review over the validity of invoking Article XXI, that panels should 
determine whether the measure addresses the particular national security 
interest specified, and that panels should review whether a sufficient nexus 
between the interest and the measure exists.353 The panel should also 
determine as a factual matter whether one of the situations listed under 
Article XXI(b)(i)–(iii) exists.354 While a member can indicate its desired 
level of security protection, a panel should be able to review whether the 
interests at stake could reasonably be considered an essential security 
interest.355 The panel should also assess whether the measure could plausibly 
 
 347. DSU, supra note 345, art. 7.1. 
 348. See generally id. (referring to Article XXI). 
 349. Appellate Body Members, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/ab _members_descrp_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 350. Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/ 
c7s2p1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 351. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, 30, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R 
(adopted Apr. 26, 2019) (citing First Written Submission of Russia at para. 7) [hereinafter Panel Report]. 
 352. Id. at 37–38 (citing United States Response to Panel Question No. 1, paras. 3, 17–22) 
(explaining that the United States argues there are no legal standards to apply making a panel 
recommendation impossible). 
 353. Id. at 35 (citing European Union’s third-party submission, para. 11). 
 354. Id. (citing European Union’s third-party submission, para. 14). 
 355. Id. (citing European Union’s third-party submission, para. 17). 
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be considered capable of protecting a security interest from threat.356 While 
the European Union recognizes the self-judging language, the European 
Union believes this determination regarding what is “necessary” should still 
be reviewed for good faith and plausibility. The European Union argues 
parties invoking the exception should have to explain why they consider the 
measure necessary.357 The European Union also wants to invoke the 
“necessary” test under Article XX to have the panel consider the interests of 
third parties and possible alternatives.358 
Many countries have suggested some sort of middle ground.359 Most 
nations agree that review needs to be somewhat limited to respect national 
sovereignty and the need to define one’s own national security interests. 
However, giving nations unbounded discretion would create a huge loophole 
that would be open for abuse, contrary to the requirements of good-faith 
interpretation and the stated requirements of Article XXI. 
When interpreting the GATT, the DSU calls for panels and the 
Appellate Body to interpret the agreements “in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law.”360 Treaty interpretation 
under customary international law361 is governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT lay out 
treaty interpretation and are often invoked by WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body when interpreting the WTO agreements.362 Article 31 provides the 
general rules of interpretation, which include that a treaty “shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”363 Context for these purposes include the surrounding text, the 
preamble, and annexes of the agreement.364 Subsequent practice can also be 
 
 356. Id. (citing European Union’s third-party submission, para. 21). 
 357. Id. (citing European Union’s third-party submission, para. 21). 
 358. Id. (citing European Union’s third-party submission, paras. 21, 23). 
 359. See, e.g., id. at 33–37 (submissions of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, Moldova, 
Singapore, and Turkey). 
 360. DSU, supra note 345, art. 3.2. 
 361. This means that it is often invoked when a nation involved is not a member to the treaty. The 
U.S. Senate has never ratified the VCLT. 
 362. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 163, 197, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) 
(the United States asserting that the Panel could not have found that “gambling” fell within the definition 
of “sporting” had they properly followed Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and that it is neither 
necessary nor appropriate to have recourse to Article 32). 
 363. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, para.1, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 364. Id. art. 31, para. 2 
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relevant and taken into account.365 In the event that an analysis under Article 
31 yields an ambiguous or manifestly absurd meaning, or just to confirm 
what was determined under Article 31, a treaty interpreter may apply Article 
32. Article 32 provides for a supplementary means of interpretation where 
preparatory work of the treaty or the circumstances of its conclusion are 
examined.366 
It is unlikely a treaty interpreter would determine that claims under 
Article XXI are completely unreviewable. Considering the positions of 
Russia and the United States, for Article XXI to be unreviewable, there 
would need to be completely self-judging language so that there is no 
objective standard by which to judge the claim of the responding member. 
In assessing the exception, one must start with the ordinary language of the 
treaty. The chapeau of Article XXI provides that the treaty will not be 
interpreted as prohibiting a member “from taking any action which [the 
member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interest.” “Which it considers” does indicate there is some level of self-
judgment; however, this is not the end of Article XXI(b). Following that 
statement is a list of three situations, one of which needs to be met before 
invoking Article XXI(b). 
Ordinary principles of language indicate that the three situations 
following the chapeau are not conditioned by the “which it considers” 
language. For one, the phrases start off with “relating to” or “taken in” and 
then are followed by situations that contain no qualifying language. In 
addition to not being modified by “which it considers,” the three situations 
listed in Article XXI(b)(i)–(iii) are determinable factual situations. The 
situations listed in Article XXI(b)(i) and XX(b)(ii) are where the action at 
issue is “relating to” either (1) fissionable materials or (2) the trafficking in 
arms or supplying of the military. The third scenario in Article XXI(b)(iii) 
requires the action be “taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations.” 
While there may not be a precise definition of “other emergency in 
international relations,” this is not the only instance where an international 
treaty has provided exceptions to general commitments in cases of an 
“emergency.” For example, the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) has a provision that allows for suspensions of human rights 
protections during “war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the 
independence or security of a State Party.”367 Violations of the ACHR can 
 
 365. Id. art. 31, para 3(b). 
 366. Id. art. 32. 
 367. Claudio Grossman, A Framework for the Examination of States of Emergency Under the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 1 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35, 42 (1986). 
SCOTT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:07 PM 
432 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 30:379 
be petitioned to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
indicating reviewability when an “emergency” exists.368 While the example 
here has no bearing on the meaning of “other emergency in international 
relations” in the GATT, it does show that similar language in a treaty was 
not considered so subjective as to preclude the ability to interpret the treaty 
language. 
Looking at the broader context of the agreement, the GATT’s purpose 
is to promote the security and predictability of mutually advantageous 
arrangements and the decrease of barriers to trade.369 These goals would 
indicate that the treaty did not intentionally create a large loophole to the 
commitment of reduced barriers to trade. The language of Article XXI(b)(i)-
(iii), the DSU Agreement, and the purposes of the GATT indicate that WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body can review Article XXI and that the 
conditions for invoking the Article should be reviewable. 
Another tougher question would be to what extent the chapeau of 
Article XXI can be reviewed. The language of the chapeau states that the 
GATT agreement would not be understood to hinder a member state “from 
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests.”370 One possibility is that the self-judging aspect 
of the clause only applies to the determination that a certain action was 
“necessary.”371 This would leave open the possibility for a panel to determine 
whether the measure truly protects a security interest or if that security 
interest is essential. However, this reading seems somewhat strained. For 
one, as a textual matter, there is nothing disjunctive in the phrase “necessary 
for the protection of its essential national security interests” that would 
indicate “which it considers” only applies to part of the phrase. Second, as a 
matter of common sense, a nation is in the best position to determine “its 
essential security interests.” Third, while there is a tension between nations 
not wanting an international tribunal to judge whether its essential security 
threats are at issue and not wanting to leave a major loophole in the GATT 
agreements, the narrowest reading of self-judgment is unlikely where this 
 
 368. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” arts. 27 & 44, Nov. 22, 
1969, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-21,1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 369. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless 
Chicken Cuts, ¶ 243, WTO Docs. WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2005) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report]; GATT, supra note 28, at Preamble (“Being desirous . . . entering 
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to . . . reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.”). 
 370. GATT, supra note 28, art. XXI(b) (emphasis added). 
 371. This is the argument of the European Union. See Panel Report, supra note 351, ¶ 7.43. (“The 
European Union argues that the terms ‘which it considers’ in the first part of Article XXI(b) qualify only 
the term ‘necessary.’”). 
SCOTT(DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:07 PM 
2020] STEEL STANDING: WHAT’S NEXT FOR SECTION 232? 433 
balance is struck. 
A reading that makes the chapeau of Article XXI largely self-judging 
would not have to foreclose all review. Under principles of public 
international law and the VCLT, the idea of pacta sunt servanda, or that 
every treaty must be performed in good faith, is required.372 Since this is a 
legal obligation of the parties to a treaty, a panel could look to whether a 
party acted in good faith. Of course, a panel would likely start off with the 
presumption that the party invoking Article XXI is acting in good faith if it 
has given reasons for why it considered the action necessary for the 
protection of an essential security interest.373 But if the complaining party 
can demonstrably show that the respondent member either did not think the 
interest was “essential” or if it did not think its action was truly “necessary” 
to protect that interest, then the panel could determine Article XXI was not 
properly invoked. 
Another possible approach is to have a sliding scale between the 
severity of the predicate situations in Article XXI(b)(i)–(iii) and whether the 
invoking member truly thought such action was necessary to protect an 
essential security interest. The more intense the “emergency” under Article 
XXI(b)(iii) for example, the more lenient the panel would be in determining 
whether the responding party met the requirements of the chapeau. This 
approach would further the goals of the GATT by balancing sovereignty and 
the ability to protect essential security interests with policing the use of the 
national security exception as a loophole to compliance with WTO 
obligations. 
Under VCLT Article 32, an analysis of the drafting history of the 
language that eventually became Article XXI supports the idea that Article 
XXI was meant to strike a balance. Specifically, striking a balance between 
the flexibility for nations to make their own security decisions and the need 
to police the exception from being used to evade WTO commitments. 
Recently, scholar Mona Pinchis-Paulsen dove into internal U.S. debates 
during the drafting of the national security exception for the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), which was supposed to be the “WTO” of its 
time.374 The U.S. delegation, after internal debate, opposed language that 
 
 372. VCLT, supra note 363, art. 26. 
 373. In other contexts, panels will “presume” a party’s measure is in compliance with the WTO. See, 
e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 278, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) (“We must assume that Members of the WTO will abide by 
their treaty obligations in good faith, as required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda articulated in 
[the VCLT]. And, always in dispute settlement, every Member of the WTO must assume the good faith 
of every other Member.”). 
 374. See Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 329, at 109–116 (setting for the methodology of “analyzing 
internal U.S. practice during the making of Article XXI”). 
SCOTT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2020  8:07 PM 
434 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 30:379 
entrenched a wholly unilateral interpretation of the national security 
exception.375 The language that was negotiated and agreed to in the ITO 
context was eventually used for the GATT.376 Review of the meeting 
transcripts from these negotiations show a similar debate. The parties 
intended there would be limited circumstances where Article XXI could be 
invoked, and the security exception would remain subject to the dispute 
settlement provisions.377 
C. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit Panel Decision 
After failed consultations with Russia, Ukraine requested the 
composition of a panel to decide whether Russia violated its obligation of 
freedom of transit in enacting multiple restrictions on traffic from Ukraine 
through Russia to third countries.378 Russia invoked Article XXI as a 
defense, saying these measures were necessary for protection of its essential 
security interests and were made in compliance with Article XXI(b)(iii).379 
Russia also contended that the panel did not have jurisdiction to consider the 
national security exception.380 
The panel had to evaluate whether it could review Russia’s defense and, 
if it could, whether Russia met the requirement of Article XX1(b)(iii).381 The 
panel determined that the logical structure of the provision meant that the 
entire provision could not be self-judging because the three sub-paragraphs 
qualified the chapeau, not the other way around.382 Also, the panel thought 
that the sub-paragraphs were designed to be evaluated objectively.383 The 
panel also determined that Article XXI being left to the “unilateral will” of 
a member was inconsistent with the broad object and purpose of creating 
stability and security in trade.384 Surveys sent out to member states regarding 
the meaning of Article XXI yielded divergent interpretations, meaning there 
has not been sufficient subsequent practice to solidify an interpretation by 
 
 375. See id. at 159–63. See id. at 159–63 (showing that the U.S. delegation removed the language 
“and to relate to” from the security exceptions article which would have provided an ITO member explicit 
authority to determine unilaterally whether such measure qualified as a circumstance enumerated in the 
subparagraphs of the provision). 
 376. Id. at 187. 
 377. Panel Report, supra note 351, ¶ 7.98. 
 378. DS12: Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Summary of Findings, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds512_e.htm (last accessed May 3, 2020). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Panel Report, supra note 351, ¶¶ 7.27–.28. 
 381. Id. ¶¶ 7.58. 
 382. Id. ¶ 7.65. 
 383. Id. ¶ 7.77. 
 384. Id. ¶ 7.79. 
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the parties.385 The negotiating history of the ITO was also examined.386 The 
panel concluded that the treaty drafters considered that: 
a.  the matters later reflected in Article XX and Article XXI of the GATT 
1947 were considered to have a different character, as evident from their 
separation into two articles; 
b.  the “balance” that was struck by the security exceptions was that 
Members could have “some latitude” to determine what their essential 
security interests are, and the necessary action to protect those interest, 
while potential abuse of the exceptions would be curtailed by limiting the 
circumstances in which the exceptions could be invoked to those specified 
in the subparagraphs of Article XXI(b); and 
c.  in the light of this balance, the security exceptions would remain subject 
to the consultations and dispute settlement provisions set forth elsewhere 
in the Charter.387 
Next, the panel had to determine whether Russia’s measures were 
“taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” Russia 
attempted to be coy about what emergency it was responding to, but Russia 
was clearly responding to its conflict with Ukraine over Crimea.388 The panel 
noted that, in determining whether there was an “emergency in international 
relations,” it would not take into account who was internationally responsible 
or to characterize the situation other than the terms of its “emergency 
state.”389 The panel looked to how the international community characterized 
the situation and determined that the Russia-Ukraine issue is a serious armed 
conflict.390 Because the actions taken were subsequent to when the conflict 
started, the panel was satisfied that the measures were introduced “during the 
emergency in international relations” for purposes of subparagraph (iii).391 
As for the chapeau, the panel determined that a member-state’s 
determination of “essential security interests,”392 given that determination is 
made in good faith,393 and “necessity”394 are self-judging. To show good faith 
for the “essential security interests” determination, the member invoking the 
defense must “articulate the essential security interests said to arise from the 
emergency . . . sufficiently enough to demonstrate their veracity.”395 What is 
 
 385. Id. ¶ 7.80. 
 386. Id. at 43–50. 
 387. Id. ¶ 7.98. 
 388. Id. ¶ 7.119. 
 389. Id. ¶ 7.121. 
 390. Id. ¶ 7.122. 
 391. Id. ¶ 7.124. 
 392. Id. ¶ 7.131. 
 393. Id. ¶ 7.132. 
 394. Id. ¶ 7.146. 
 395. Id. ¶ 7.134. 
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a sufficient explanation will be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the 
bar will be higher where the “emergency” is less intense.396 The panel itself 
would “review whether the measures are so remoted from, or unrelated to,” 
the emergency that it is not plausible that the “measure is for the protection 
of its essential security interests arising out of the emergency.”397 Ultimately, 
the panel determined that Russia met the exception, but only barely, since 
Russia refused to justify their actions responding to the national security 
threat in anything but hypotheticals.398 
By holding Russia’s actions reviewable, the panel gave some teeth to 
the WTO agreements by ensuring Article XXI would not provide a non-
reviewable loophole to the parties’ obligations. By not assessing Russia’s 
role and arguably illegal actions under international law in creating the 
national security situation in the first place, the panel avoided passing 
judgment on an issue governed outside of the WTO agreements and outside 
the expertise of the panel. The action the WTO legitimized was not Russia’s 
invasion of Ukraine, but its imposition of traffic measures. 
D. Section 232 Likely Does Not Qualify Under Article XXI 
Under the interpretations of Article XXI(b) provided above, it is 
unlikely the U.S. national security tariffs on steel would survive scrutiny. 
Many other WTO members also do not think the United States’ actions under 
Section 232 comply with WTO rules. China, India, the European Union, 
Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey have all filed 
complaints with the WTO,399 and several parties have reserved their third-
party rights.400 Panels have been established for all cases.401 
The first step would be to determine whether the United States could 
 
 396. Id. ¶ 7.135. 
 397. Id. ¶ 7.139. 
 398. Id. ¶¶ 7.148, 7.114. 
 399. Request for Consultations by Canada, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/1 (June 1, 2018); Request for Consultations by China, United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS544/1 (Apr. 5, 2018); Request 
for Consultations by the European Union, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 1, 2018); Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS551/1 (June 5, 2018); Request 
for Consultations by Norway, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS552/1 (June 12, 2018); Request for Consultations by Russia, United States—Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS554/1 (June 29, 2018); Request for 
Consultations by Switzerland, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS556/1 (July 9, 2018); Request for Consultations by Turkey, United States—Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS564/1 (Aug. 15, 2018). 
 400. FEFER, supra note 33, at 1. 
 401. See, e.g., Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Canada, United States—Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/12 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
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invoke one of the predicate situations provided for in Article XXI(b)(i)–(iii). 
The recent steel orders do not fall under the first situation relating to 
fissionable materials. The second condition is “relating to the traffic in arms, 
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment.” “Relating to” would require an ends-means fit 
between trafficking of goods to supply the military and the measure at issue. 
The main issue would be how indirect the supply to the military may 
be. The steel targeted by the current steel orders is almost entirely for civilian 
uses, not for supplying the military. This condition sounds like it could 
qualify for the steel orders, since the purpose of the orders is to have the 
capacity to supply the United States’ defense needs in the future. Steel might 
be “indirectly” supplying a military establishment by providing relief to the 
domestic industry so it can continue its long-term supply, including to the 
military. When the United States first began drafting a national security 
exception for an international agreement, the security exception covered 
measures “relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, 
and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies.”402 This 
formulation is much narrower and would cover actual arms trafficking, such 
as what International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) covers,403 and 
other military supplies, but only in exceptional circumstances. 
While drafting the national security exception, representatives from the 
military pushed for a more expansive category than this initial proposal, 
despite concern from State Department officials.404 A broadening change 
was approved by the United States in its internal debates to include “such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment.”405 State Department officials interpreted 
this language to include “only that portion (meaning specific shipment of 
specific goods) . . . with the end purpose of actually supplying the military[,] 
whether going directly to the military or to private hands.”406 The military 
representatives wanted to add the words “directly or indirectly” to bring the 
text into harmony with the then proposed Munitions Control Act.407 This 
language was likely to clarify that the provision covered supplies that would 
 
 402. Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 329, at 128. 
 403. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, Understand the ITAR and Export Controls, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/?id=ddtc_public_portal_itar_landing (last visited Apr. 15, 
2019). 
 404. Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 329, at 138. 
 405. Id. at 142. 
 406. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP M-23/46, at 6–7 (July 19, 
1946)). 
 407. Id. at 154. 
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end up supplying the military, even if not being directly shipped to the 
military or perhaps being used as an input material for a product made to the 
military. 
The drafters thought this language only applied to specific shipments, 
not the general class of material. So, the United States would be able to 
prohibit Raytheon from importing steel that was being used to create supplies 
contracted for by the military, even though that shipment of steel was not 
going to the military directly. Or more directly, when a private party enters 
into a government contract, the government could require a company to 
source only domestic materials. The ability for future military supply 
rationale here is likely too attenuated to fall under this exception since the 
actual shipments of steel that are subject to tariffs are not being used to 
supply the military. This limit makes sense if the United States wanted to 
avoid situations where countries would limit the trade of numerous dual-use 
raw materials in the name of national security. 
The last situation covered in Article XXI(b)(iii) is measures “taken in 
time of war or other emergency in international relations[.]” In some sense, 
the United States is constantly “in [a] time of war” or “other emergency in 
international relations,” since it fights in so many conflicts. Explaining the 
view of the U.S. negotiators understanding of emergency, a State 
Department official explained that “the U.S. had in mind the situation that 
existed before it entered the Second World War at the end of 1941, where 
the U.S. government ‘required, for our own protection, to take many 
measures which would have been prohibited by the Charter.’”408 This 
indicates that the measures taken would need some connection to a war or 
other emergency in international relations. Without such a connection, a 
nation could always be in wars and violate the WTO agreements. Another 
telling sign was that the panel in Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in 
Transit did not consider Russia “in a state of war,” but rather that it was 
involved in an “other emergency in international relations” even though 
Russia is involved, for example, in the Syrian conflict. Because the action 
was taken in response to the armed hostilities in Ukraine, this was the 
security issue that the panel considered relevant. 
Another relevant issue is how hostile a situation needs to be to qualify 
as an “other emergency in international relations.” The panel report in 
Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit determined “other 
emergency in international relations” likely means a “situation of armed 
conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of a heightened tension or crisis, or of 
 
 408. Id. at 170–71 (citing U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n A, Verbatim Report on Its 
Thirty Third Meeting, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33, at 20 (July 24, 1947)). 
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general instability engulfing or surrounding a state.”409 This definition 
comports with the drafting history of the United States’ proposal, which 
shows a relaxation from “in time of war or imminent threat of war” to “in 
time of war or other emergency in international relations,” indicating less 
than a formal war was required to invoke the exception.410 
The United States is not as geographically close to its conflicts, unlike 
Russia, who is in an armed conflict over its border with Ukraine, suggesting 
a less imminent threat.411 Additionally, the United States’ concerns over its 
steel production is not based on current conflicts, but rather potential future 
conflict. “Emergency of international relations” likely refers to current or 
imminent emergencies, not concern over future conflict. Therefore, the 
United States is unlikely to fall under Article XXI(b)(iii). 
One major difference between the situation in Russia—Measures 
Concerning Traffic in Transit and the U.S. measures is that the essential 
security interest, the measure, and the event that qualified for Article 
XXI(b)(iii) were all related. Because the United States itself never cited 
“war,” armed conflict, or any impending emergency that was not economic 
as a reason for enacting the recent steel orders,412 this lack of connection 
between all of the components of Article XXI(b) might make the United 
States’ argument for falling under that exception much weaker. 
It is possible that a panel would doubt the chapeau of Article XXI(b) 
would be met in “good faith.” As its “essential security interests,” the U.S. 
can argue that a domestic source of steel to supply its military would amount 
to an interest “relating to the quintessential functions of the state, namely, 
the protection of its territory and its population from external threats.” 
However, the United States is not in danger of being unable to supply the 
military with domestic steel,413 and the United States has long been 
aggressively using trade remedies to protect the steel industry’s economic 
interests.414 This may lead a panel to question whether the United States was 
making the argument in good faith. 
If the WTO did find the United States in violation of the GATT and 
unable to qualify for the National Security exception, the United States 
 
 409. Panel Report, supra note 351, ¶ 7.76. 
 410. Pinchis-Paulsen, supra note 329, at 141. 
 411. Alex Johnson, Russia Attacks, Seizes Ukrainian Vessels in Black Sea Off Crimea, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/russia-attacks-seizes-three-
ukrainian-naval-vessels-coast-crimea-black-n939876. 
 412. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., supra note 70. 
 413. See Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense, supra note 84. 
 414. Daniel J. Ikenson, Antidumping 101: Everything You Need to Know about the Steel Industry’s 
Favorite Protectionist Bludgeon, CATO INST. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/anti-trade-
barbarians-gate. 
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would not necessarily have to remove the tariffs. The United States could 
just compensate the complaining parties or allow for countermeasures to be 
levied against the United States’ imports.415 
VI. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The best avenue for limiting presidential actions under Section 232 is 
for Congress to amend Section 232. Congress is institutionally the most 
competent actor to define the limits around this national security and trade 
power. Action from Congress would alleviate the need for the courts to 
implement a stronger delegation doctrine, as discussed in Part III. 
Congressional action will also keep the courts from defining “threaten to 
impair the national security,” which does not have an obvious definition. The 
courts are also not necessarily the right body to define “threaten to impair 
the national security,” since the definition itself may inherently involve 
policy determinations. 
Because of the strong domestic economic effects tariffs have, there are 
competence and institutional reasons for why Congress is the better body for 
making domestic, economic policy decisions.416 Though the executive may 
be able to act quicker in “emergency situations,” concerns of domestic 
production capacity and “economic weakening” of industries has not 
happened so quickly that Congress cannot deal with the issue. Additionally, 
Congress has acted quickly in certain emergency situations.417 While courts 
should assume government actors act in good faith, Congress does not need 
to accept this assumption as fact. The current administration has used Section 
232 as a means of leveraging trade negotiations, and many have speculated 
that national security is not the true driver for action.418 “Gentleman’s 
agreements” that everyone act in good faith is not sufficient to ensure 
reasonable exercise of discretion. These broadly-worded statutes are 
 
 415. See generally FEFER, supra note 33. 
 416. See supra Section III.C. 
 417. Several resolutions were passed immediately after 9/11. See Law 360, Five Laws and 
Regulations that Emerged From 9/11, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.ballardspahr.com/eventsnews/mediacoverage/2016-09-09-five-laws-and-regulations-that-
emerged-from-9-11. Congress quickly provided funds to deal with the swine flu. SARAH A. LISTER & C. 
STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R40554, THE 2009 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: AN OVERVIEW 
17 (2009). 
 418. See, e.g., Trade Talks Episode 87: Trump Shifts His National Security Threats (Again), 
PETERSON PERSPECTIVES: INTERVIEWS ON CURRENT ISSUES (May 20, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/peterson-perspectives-interviews-on-current-issues/ 
id290857318?i=1000438875745; see also President Trump: “When It Comes to Leverage, Tariffs Are 
King”—What You Need to Know, THE TRADE PRACTITIONER (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.tradepractitioner.com/2019/05/president-trump-when-it-comes-to-leverage-tariffs-are-
king-what-you-need-to-know/. 
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worrisome because they are susceptible to abuse.419 
Suggesting Congressional action as a solution is always problematic 
because the actual likelihood of Congress being able to act is low,420 
especially as polarization increases.421 Due to its many voices and competing 
interests, Congress passes relatively little legislation.422 But the President’s 
trade policy and threatened or real action under “national security” statutes 
are in the headlines. Tariffs were even mentioned in the cold open of 
Saturday Night Live’s Season 44 finale.423 Several bills have been introduced 
in Congress concerning Section 232.424 Because of the public attention, there 
might be enough pressure to get over Congressional gridlock. In this section, 
I suggest several possible actions for Congress to cabin the discretion and 
power of the President under Section 232. 
One possibility is for Congress to amend Section 232 to add some sort 
of “legislative veto.” The Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha determined that 
congressional action affecting the legal rights of others must meet 
bicameralism and presentment.425 There are still uses for legislative vetoes, 
regardless of bicameralism or presentment issues. For one, even if there is 
no actual, legal effect, legislative vetoes provide a signal from Congress that 
may affect how others behave.426 Congress still holds the power of the purse, 
 
 419. See Paul Kahn & Kiel Brennan Marquez, National Emergency Funding of Border Wall Is 
Unconstitutional, THE HILL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/433923-national-
emergency-funding-of-border-wall-is-unconstitutional. 
 420. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for An Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare 
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 188 (1989) (“[T]he power of congressional leaders is largely a negative 
power; they often can control the agenda in a manner that effectively kills certain proposed legislation.”). 
 421. Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1701 (2015) (“Based on the widely used empirical measure, DW-Nominate, 
congressional polarization has been steadily and consistently increasing since the 1980s.”). 
 422. Drew Desilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws Than Before, but 
Not More Substance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress/; Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics 
on Congress, BROOKINGS (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-6-Legislative-Productivity-in-Congress-and-Workload_UPDATE.pdf. 
 423. Saturday Night Live, Don’t Stop Me Now Cold Open – SNL, YOUTUBE (May 18, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ejAjdcRC28Y (at 0:26 and 2:55) (Alec Baldwin as Donald Trump 
“[finally having time in the summer to do things like] enjoying all the fantastic new tariffs on China” and 
Kate McKinnon as Wilbur Ross “Do you guys like tariffs? $100 bucks for a tomato? I’m not sweating 
it”). 
 424. FEFER, supra note 33. 
 425. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding the one house legislative veto 
unconstitutional). While this legislative veto is bicameral, a new law would need to be effectively passed 
to satisfy the constitutional requirements of new legislation, so the President could veto any 
Congressional disapproval unless Congress secured a two-thirds vote in each house. 
 426. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 
288 (1993); See also Jacob Gersen & Eric Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L.R. 573, 580–82 (2008) (observing that even if a law does not meet Constitutional requirements, 
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and such a strong statement might signal to the President that program 
funding important to him might suffer. Another is the poor optics of the 
President unilaterally acting in an originally legislative area, despite the 
disapproval of Congress. This scenario would likely hurt the President’s 
prospects of reelection. 
Congress added a mechanism for a congressional disapproval 
resolution for presidential actions under Section 232 against petroleum or 
petroleum product imports in 1980.427 While this disapproval mechanism 
was never used,428 Congress and the courts did act in other ways that induced 
President Carter to rescind his actions under Section 232 in regards to 
petroleum imports in 1980.429 The disapproval resolution as written may not 
be constitutionally enforceable, unless Congress presented such resolution 
to the President.430 Subsequent to this amendment, no Section 232 action 
against petroleum imports has been implemented, even though several 
investigations were launched.431 If the President knows Congress does not 
approve of his use of Section 232 to the point that Congress passes a 
bicameral disapproval resolution, he may be less likely to continue his 
Section 232 measure. 
Another option would be to keep presidential determinations under 
Section 232 from taking legal effect until Congress acts (or fails to act after 
a certain time period). This may get around the “legislative veto” limit in 
Chadha, since Congress would not be overriding “law.” Rather, approval by 
Congress would be a necessary step in implementing the measure. 
Another option would be for Congress to increase procedural hurdles. 
For example, an independent agency, like the ITC, could launch the 
investigation of whether there is a situation that “threatens to impair the 
national security.” The ITC may not be a security expert, but it is an expert 
on how imports affect the domestic industry.432 It regularly releases expert 
economic reports433 and makes domestic injury determinations in anti-
 
legislation “nonetheless may affect behavior”). 
 427. FEFER, supra note 33. 
 428. Id. at 37. A bill a disapproval was introduced, but the Senate indefinitely postponed the bill after 
it passed the house. Id. 
 429. Through another bill that ended Presidential action and was attached to a bill that raised the 
public debt ceiling, something Carter desperately needed passed. See id. The courts disapproved of the 
mechanism President Carter used as it was not only against imports. See Indep. Gasoline Marketers 
Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 430. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(f). 
 431. FEFER, supra note 33. 
 432. Mission, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/mission_ 
statement.htm (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 433. Industry and Economic Analysis, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/ 
research_and_analy-sis.htm (last visited May 27, 2019). 
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dumping and countervailing duty cases. Because the ITC is an independent 
agency, it is under less presidential control than an agency like the 
Department of Commerce, where the secretary can be removed at will. 
Another option would be for another Department, such as the Department of 
Defense, to agree to the findings and recommended action by Commerce 
before the President could act. It makes sense to require both an economic 
and a defense agency to agree to action under Section 232, since it blends 
security and economic concerns. This would at least ensure that multiple 
agencies, hopefully not captured by the same actors, think action under the 
statute is appropriate. 
Congress could allow judicial review of such action, though this may 
not be meaningful without substantive amendments giving courts better 
guidelines for review under the statute. Allowing a form of “arbitrary and 
capricious” review would at least ensure the Department of Commerce 
considers and responds to all arguments made by the public. 
Congress could also amend the substance of Section 232 to ensure it 
has made the major policy decisions.434 Congress could define what 
“threaten to impair the national security” or what “national security” means. 
However, this task might not be easy or realistic for Congress. It would be 
hard to agree on a definition that appeases both parties and is still specific 
enough to evade abusive interpretation. The easiest substantive amendment 
may be to specify that “threaten to impair the national security” requires 
some imminence. An issue with the current steel order is that its justifications 
regarding dependence on foreign imports and complete collapse of the 
domestic industry seems like a distant problem. Secretary Mattis stated that 
the U.S. military requirements for steel only amount to three percent of U.S. 
production and that the findings in the report would not impact the ability of 
the DOD to supply its defense programs.435 An imminence issue also 
supports shifting the power from Congress to the President who can act 
quicker. If this is a longer-term economic or security issue that does not 
require immediate action or technical expertise (enacting a tariff does not 
require much), there is no reason for the President to act over Congress. 
Congress could still delegate exclusion requests or the more technical issues 
to the appropriate executive agencies. 
Congress could also repeal Section 232 in its entirety, though allowing 
 
 434. Senator Sasse has lamented at Congress’s abdication of its responsibilities and traces the hyper-
politicization of the Supreme Court to such practice. Ben Sasse, Blame Congress for Politicizing the 
Court, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blame-congress-for-politicizing-the-
court-1536189015; Fox News, Sen. Ben Sasse Unloads on Congress at Kavanaugh Hearing, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?-v=EJK2JveCAbI. 
 435.  See Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense, supra note 84. 
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the President to act in imminent cases where imports “threaten to impair the 
national security” is not always a normatively bad idea. Especially with the 
recent experience of a global health pandemic, one might be open to the 
comparatively more agile actor protecting domestic industries that make, for 
example, personal protective equipment from imports during or leading up 
to a potential crisis rather than leaving such action to Congress.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the power and discretion given under Section 232 is broad 
and highlights the importance of separation of powers and structural issues 
in the United States’ system of government. While the demands of modern 
government have created a need for Congress to delegate power, Congress 
should be careful in doing so. Because the executive branch can act quickly, 
is controlled by a single political party, and is also susceptible to special 
interests, Congress should either be more detailed in its delegations or 
provide more procedural protections. With Section 232, there is little 
meaningful judicial review, the only prerequisite for presidential action is a 
finding by another executive agency (whose head the President gets to 
appoint and gets to remove at will), and the authority conferred by the statute 
is broad. Congress should be concerned about that level of unchecked power. 
The courts could change their approach to nondelegation claims, but 
Congress amending these broad statutes is the most democratically-
legitimate solution. This would ensure Congress, the most institutionally 
competent actor and the branch whose delegation is subject to abuse in the 
first place, solves the problem. 
 
